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ABSTRACT 
The power of financial accounting to shape corporate behavior is 
underappreciated.  Positive accounting theory teaches that even cosmetic changes in 
reported earnings can affect share value, not because market participants are unable to 
see through such changes to the underlying fundamentals, but because of implicit or 
explicit contracts that are based on reported earnings and transaction costs.  However, 
agency theory suggests that accounting choices and corporate responses to accounting 
standard changes will not necessarily be those that maximize share value.  For a number 
of reasons, including the fact that executive compensation often is tied to reported 
earnings, managerial preferences for high earnings generally will exceed shareholder 
preferences, leading to share value reducing tradeoffs between reported earnings and net 
cash flows.  The empirical literature on the details of positive accounting theory is mixed, 
but the evidence firmly establishes the power of accounting to shape corporate behavior. 
The power of accounting and the divergence of interests have many implications 
for courts and policy makers.  For example, consideration of proposals to increase 
conformity between tax and financial accounting rules as a means of combating tax 
sheltering and/or artificial earnings inflation must take into account the incentive 
properties of accounting standards and recognize that narrowing the gap between tax 
and book income will have economic consequences, however the gap is narrowed.  This 
Article considers this and other implications of the behavioral effects of accounting 
standards, including the possibility of setting accounting standards instrumentally as a 
means of regulating corporate behavior, an alternative to tax incentives, mandates, or 
direct subsidies.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial accounting standards and accounting decisions are vitally important to 
the managers of U.S. public companies.  Nonetheless, the courts, policy makers, and 
legal scholars focusing on corporate law generally ignore accounting whenever they are 
able, treating the subject as a black box best left to accounting professionals, without 
recognizing the impact of accounting on managerial decision making and corporate 
behavior.  This is unfortunate.  Corporate financial accounting is too important to be left 
to the accountants.  Courts and policy makers need to understand whether accounting 
standards and accounting decisions matter, and if so, how; whether managerial sensitivity 
to reported earnings reflects legitimate shareholder concerns, irrational behavior, or 
rational, but self-serving behavior; and finally whether accounting standards can serve a 
useful policy role in helping to shape managerial and corporate behavior.  Consider the 
following examples: 
 In a case described in many corporate law texts and treatises, Kamin v. American 
Express,1 the company’s directors voted to distribute to shareholders some depreciated 
securities rather than selling the securities and enjoying the benefit of a corporate tax 
loss.  The plaintiffs’ allegation, accepted by the court in considering the defendants’ 
summary judgment motion, was that the directors had made a conscious decision to 
forego about $8 million in tax savings in order to avoid a $26 million dollar reduction in 
reported earnings, even though the $26 million loss was suffered economically and was 
clearly reflected on the company’s balance sheet.2 Because the American Express 
shareholders would be unable to use the tax loss, the primary beneficiary of this decision 
appeared to be the U.S. Treasury.  The directors justified sacrificing after-tax cash flow 
for higher reported earnings arguing that a $26 million “reduction of net income would 
have a serious effect on the market value of the publicly traded American Express 
stock.”3
The court held that the board’s good faith decision was protected by the business 
judgment rule and dismissed the case.4 The court downplayed the plaintiffs’ allegation 
that some of the directors were company managers whose compensation was based in 
part on reported earnings.  Was the earnings/cash flow tradeoff in the Kamin case 
negligent?  Was it even rational?  Should the court have been more skeptical that the 
decision was in good faith and not self-serving behavior on the part of the inside 
directors? 
 Consider next the battle that has been waged over the last decade over the 
accounting treatment of compensatory stock options.  The Financial Accounting 
 
1 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y.Sup. 1976). 
2 The case involved a block of stock that American Express had purchased in Donaldson, Lufken 
and Jenrette, Inc. that had declined in value from $30 million to $4 million.  The loss on the stock was 
water under the bridge.  The only question before the directors was whether the stock should be sold by 
American Express, providing a tax benefit to offset other income, but also a reduction in earnings; or 
distributed to shareholders as a dividend.  In the latter case, the alternative selected by the directors, the tax 
benefit would be lost entirely – the shareholders would not be entitled to use it, but American Express’s 
loss on the stock would be reflected only on its balance sheet, not on its income statement.  See id. at 809-
810. 
3 Id. at 811. 
4 See id. at 812. 
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Standards Board (FASB), the private body empowered by the SEC to set accounting 
standards, formally proposed in 1993 that stock option expense be recorded and 
subtracted from reported earnings similar to all other compensation expense.5 The 
corporate lobby managed to defer mandatory expensing for twelve years until FASB 
finally forced through a rule in 2004.6
The effect of mandatory option expensing will be to reduce reported earnings for 
companies that use options.  Corporate interests opposing the new standard have argued 
that expensing will reduce share values and drastically reduce or preclude the use of 
options as a compensation device.7 Some economists argue that the accounting treatment 
is irrelevant and that managerial resistance is irrational by traditional economic ways of 
thinking.8 Members of Congress actually have weighed in on this one – but on both sides 
of the question.9 Is managerial resistance to option expensing irrational or self-serving, 
or does it reflect legitimate concerns about the effect of expensing options on share 
value? 
Next, increased consistency between financial and tax accounting has been 
proposed as a response both to tax sheltering and artificial earnings inflation.10 
Differences between financial (or book) accounting and tax accounting allow firms to 
exploit tax shelters that decrease taxable income without affecting book income and 
artificially inflate reported earnings without incurring higher corporate taxes.   Requiring 
firms to adopt the same accounting conventions for both purposes would force them to 
trade off taxes against reported earnings.  Assuming some managerial discretion, 
commentators have generally assumed that the primary result of increased book-tax 
conformity would be reduced reported earnings, since managers would act to minimize 
taxes and maximize after tax cash flows.11 Does this view properly reflect the 
importance of reported earnings to management, or would shareholders likely suffer as a 
 
5 See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Exposure Draft:  Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation (1993). 
6 See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
123 (revised 2004) (Dec. 2004) (mandating “fair value” accounting for stock options effective beginning in 
2005 and 2006). 
7 See, e.g., Wick Simmons, The Best Option, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2003, at A10 (“[I]f companies 
are forced to treat options like salaries or manufacturing costs, many will decide they can’t afford to 
continue this form of potential compensation.”).   
8 See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation:  Managerial Power Versus the 
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 860 (2002) (arguing that “[t]here is substantial 
evidence that managers respond to accounting concerns in ways that seem irrational to financial 
economists”). 
9 See Patricia M. Dechow et al, Economic Consequences of Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 3-4 (1997). 
10 See, e.g., George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters:  Taking a Lesson from 
History, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 209 (2001); Mihir A. Desai, The Degradation of Corporate Profits (working 
paper, June 2004). 
11 See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, GAAP Tax, 83 TAX NOTES 425 (1999) (arguing that book-tax 
conformity would cause a significant drop in GAAP income); Yin, supra note 10, at 227 (noting that a tax 
based primarily on financial income could lead some companies to report lower earnings to reduce taxes); 
Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Book-Tax Conformity for Corporate Income:  An Introduction to the 
Issues 28 (working paper, Oct. 2004) (noting that book-tax conformity could lead to a race to the bottom on 
effective tax rates).  To be sure, none of these sources suggest that firms would completely ignore reported 
earnings, but the general tenor is that tax effects would likely dominate. 
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result of increased book-tax conformity as managers forewent valid tax deductions in 
order to keep reported earnings high?  More importantly, what would be the broader 
economic consequences of eliminating the gaps between financial and tax accounting?   
Finally, consider a hypothetical accounting standard change that has the effect of 
decreasing reported expenses (and thus increasing reported earnings) related to the 
purchase of a certain class of assets.  Given managerial sensitivity to reported earnings as 
demonstrated in Kamin, the stock option expensing saga, and numerous studies recounted 
below, would such an accounting change serve as a valuable incentive device, perhaps as 
an alternative to tax incentives?  This Article argues that the stock option accounting 
regime in place over the last decade has, in fact, acted as an accounting incentive and 
helps explain the widespread use of options.  This was largely unintentional and probably 
not salutary, but the impact of accounting rules on compensation design suggests the 
potential for instrumental accounting. 
Thoughtful consideration of the foregoing questions requires exploration of 
accounting theory and related empirical evidence.  Accounting theory seeks to explain 
how accounting standards affect share prices and corporate behavior and how firms 
choose between permissible standards.  One goal of this Article is to introduce the legal 
academic community to the dominant theory among accounting researchers today, which 
is known as positive accounting theory.12 
In brief, positive accounting theory posits that accounting matters because of 
transaction costs.13 Absent transaction costs, accounting standards and practices would 
be irrelevant because the capital markets are able to “see through” various accounting 
presentations to the underlying value of securities as long as (1) there are no tax or other 
direct cash flow effects and (2) there is no material change in the information publicly 
available to investors.14 The markets cannot be fooled, for example, by a firm switching 
its method of financial depreciation.  However, a change in accounting standards can 
affect a firm’s cash flows if that change affects various explicit or implicit contracts that 
are tied to reported financial results.  For example, most public companies issue debt that 
is protected by accounting-based covenants.  In order to ensure sufficient assets to repay 
the debt, borrowers typically covenant, inter alia, to maintain a certain level of working 
capital and to limit the pool from which dividends may be paid to shareholder investment 
 
12 Although legal academics generally are familiar with the efficient capital markets hypothesis 
and the capital asset pricing model, which form the basis of modern accounting theory, references in the 
legal literature to positive accounting theory are sparse.  A terms and connectors search of the “JLR” 
database in Westlaw for “positive accounting theory” produces only nine hits. 
13 See generally ROSS L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY 
(1986); Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory:  A Ten Year Perspective, 65 
ACCT. REV. 131 (1990); see also infra Part I.B. 
14 At one time, researchers concluded based on these theories that accounting standards and 
practices were essentially irrelevant.  See, e.g., WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 72-73; Watts & 
Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 133 (discussing accounting irrelevance theory); Robert W. Holthausen & 
Richard W. Leftwich, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Choice, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 77, 80 
(1983) (discussing early tests finding no stock price reaction to changes in accounting techniques except for 
changes affecting taxes); see also infra Part I.B.   
However, accounting standards seemed to matter in practice, and researchers noticed patterns in 
firms’ choices between acceptable accounting standards that were surprisingly regular if accounting were 
irrelevant.  A fuller theory was required, and positive accounting theory was the result. 
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plus accumulated profits.15 Both the violation and renegotiation of debt covenants is 
costly.  Thus, an accounting change that reduces reported earnings and increases the 
chance of covenant violation should reduce expected cash flows and adversely affect 
stock prices, particularly for firms that are highly leveraged.  But positive accounting 
theory suggests that an earnings-reducing change may produce benefits as well.  Sticky 
earnings-based compensation contracts would become less expensive for shareholders 
and the risk of high reported earnings resulting in costly political repercussions (think 
windfall profits taxes) would be reduced. 
While positive accounting theory explains why shareholders might care about 
earnings, there are several reasons to believe that managers’ appetite for high reported 
earnings will exceed that of the shareholders.  Most importantly, to some extent 
managerial compensation is based directly or indirectly on reported earnings.  In addition, 
managers may hold an honest but mistaken belief that reported earnings directly affect 
share value, a position known as the naïve investor view, or they may be socialized into 
placing inordinate importance on reported earnings as a result of the excessive attention 
that stock analysts place on these figures.  As a result there often will be a conflict 
between shareholder and managerial preferences for earnings.  Managerial agency theory, 
which focuses on the irreducible gap between shareholder preference and manager action 
in a world of imperfect information, suggests that shareholders will rarely win this 
contest.  In my view, accounting academics have significantly underestimated the 
importance of managerial agency theory in their research.  In a sense, the theoretical 
thrust of this Article is to more closely intertwine two existing, though heretofore largely 
independent, strands of research – positive accounting theory and agency theory. 
The empirical evidence, which this Article reviews in some detail, supports this 
integrated view.16 The most consistent and robust result from the empirical literature on 
accounting and corporate behavior is confirmation of what any practitioner will tell you:  
accounting matters; it is not irrelevant.  Or, more importantly, managers act as if 
accounting mattered.  However, although some of the evidence is consistent with the 
detailed predictions of positive accounting theory, much of the evidence is equally 
consistent with a manager-driven or agency cost theory of accounting choice.   
And that brings us back to the questions originally posed and the final goal of this 
Article, which is to consider the implications of a more nuanced understanding of 
accounting theory and corporate behavior.  First, can managerial decisions like those in 
Kamin or managerial opposition to stock option expensing possibly be in shareholder 
interests?  Possibly, but it’s unlikely.  Based on our current understanding of accounting 
theory, we cannot be certain that the American Express directors in Kamin were negligent 
or disloyal, or that managerial opposition to stock option accounting was largely self-
serving, but it is reasonable to suspect that this is the case.17 In Kamin, for example, the 
decision to forego the corporate sale of securities and the tax benefit in that case in order 
to avoid a large earnings hit probably did provide some shareholder benefit.  Assuming 
that American Express had debt outstanding, the earnings reduction would have pushed 
the company closer to technical default on their covenants.  For this reason, and not 
because the stock market could not see through the transparent ruse of distributing the 
 
15 See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 211. 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Part III. 
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devalued securities, the market price of American Express would have been negatively 
affected.  It is almost inconceivable, however, that the adverse stock price effect would 
have approached the $8 million tax benefit foregone or that the covenants could not have 
been renegotiated for less than $8 million.  More importantly, the analysis developed 
herein identifies the questions that shareholders and judges should ask in attempting to 
determine whether managers’ accounting choices are driven by share value concerns or 
are self serving. 
Second, positive accounting theory suggests that firms would not adopt a strategy 
of ignoring reported earnings and minimizing taxes in order to maximize share value in a 
world of increased book-tax conformity.  However, this Article argues that managers 
would go even further in sacrificing tax benefits for higher reported earnings, in all 
likelihood foregoing legitimate tax deductions and impairing share value.18 In addition, 
we should think of financial accounting standards as creating incentives just like the tax 
rules.  Thus, differences between the two sets of rules, such as depreciation rules that 
allow firms acquiring capital assets to report higher earnings to investors than to the tax 
authorities, can be thought of as tax incentives, accounting incentives, or both; and 
increased book-tax conformity, whether achieved by conforming tax with book, book 
with tax, or something in between, could have adverse consequences for the economy.   
Third, once we recognize that financial accounting standards have strong 
behavioral effects and economic consequences, the natural question to ask is whether this 
power should be harnessed and explicit accounting incentives embraced as a public 
policy tool, a supplement to the direct subsidies, mandates, and tax incentives currently 
used by Congress to shape corporate behavior.19 
It is an interesting possibility.  Unlike tax incentives and direct subsidies, 
purposeful adjustments made to accounting standards to influence behavior would have 
no direct impact on the public fisc.  But there would be costs.  First, purposeful deviation 
from economic accounting, the accounting treatment that most closely follows the 
economics of the transaction, would result in degradation of the information content of 
accounting statements and greater costs to the users of these statements.20 A second 
potential cost lies in the introduction of additional lobbying into the accounting standard 
setting process and the possibility of regulatory capture by the interest group with the 
most at stake - management.21 In many ways the costs and benefits of providing explicit 
accounting incentives and tax incentives are similar.  The difference is that mixed 
purposes, congressional involvement, and the attendant lobbying and capture issues are 
unavoidable in the tax realm, or perhaps more importantly, are irretrievably entrenched.  
This is not the case for financial accounting, which is subject to much less political 
infighting today than is tax.  Thus, although an omniscient, benevolent, and disinterested 
power could increase social welfare through judicious manipulation of accounting rules, 
we must recognize that Congress is not such a power.  While remaining open to the 
possibility of instrumental accounting, this Article concludes for now that social welfare 
is probably maximized by minimizing consideration of non-accounting consequences in 
the standard setting process. 
 
18 See infra Part IV. 
19 See infra Part V. 
20 See infra Part V.C.1. 
21 See infra Part V.C.3. 
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The organization of this Article follows that of the introduction:  Part I lays out 
the theory of accounting from the efficient capital markets hypothesis to positive 
accounting theory, with additional consideration of managerial agency theory.  Part II 
considers the empirical evidence related to the behavioral effects of accounting choice 
and accounting standards.  Part III synthesizes the theory and evidence and evaluates the 
implications for cases like Kamin and managerial opposition to stock options expensing.  
Part IV considers the implications of the behavioral effects of accounting on the book-tax 
conformity debate, and Part V takes this analysis one step further, examining the 
potential for instrumental use of accounting standards. 
 
I. ACCOUNTING THEORY 
All public companies prepare audited financial statements that are relied upon by 
investors and others.  The most important statements are the income statement, which 
provides a summary of the company’s performance over the previous year or quarter, and 
the balance sheet, which provides a snapshot view of the overall financial position of the 
company as of the end of the period.  The numbers that receive the greatest attention in 
the financial press are the net profits or earnings figures from the income statement, often 
portrayed as earnings per share of stock outstanding.  The art of accounting, though, lies 
in the detail, in determining how various transactions – purchases, sales, leases, 
commitments to retirees, etc. – are to be accounted for.  Accountants rely on a body of 
rules known as generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP.  As the name 
implies, many of these rules have not been mandated but have simply become accepted 
by the accounting profession over time.  Ultimately, however, the SEC is responsible for 
maintaining the integrity of the securities markets and has delegated to the FASB the 
power to promulgate mandatory and permissive rules of accounting practice as needed.  
As a result, companies today face an array of mandatory rules as well as choices between 
generally accepted treatments in preparing their financial statements.  
Accounting theory seeks to explain how accounting standards affect share prices 
and corporate behavior and how firms choose between permissible standards.  Our 
analysis begins with an exploration of the well-known efficient capital markets 
hypothesis and the less-well-known (to legal academics, anyway) positive accounting 
theory.  These theories suggest that accounting matters not because stock valuation is 
directly affected by accounting choices or standards but because contracts and regulatory 
costs depend explicitly or implicitly on reported earnings and these arrangements are 
sticky.  Because of transaction costs, reported earnings can have an indirect effect on 
share prices.  Nonetheless, this Part goes on to argue that corporate decision makers have 
additional incentives beyond share price maximization to prefer higher reported earnings.  
Ultimately, the relationship between financial accounting and corporate behavior depends 
on managerial agency costs as well as other transaction costs.   
 
A.  The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and the Capital Assets Pricing Model 
 
Accounting and finance researchers generally believe that a change in accounting 
standards or practices that increases or decreases reported earnings, but has no impact on 
cash flow, transaction costs, or on the information provided to the marketplace, should 
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have no effect on stock prices.22 Securities markets should see through such cosmetic 
accounting adjustments to the underlying fundamentals that determine valuation.  This 
view follows directly from the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) and the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM).23 
The CAPM simply assumes that the value of a company, and hence its stock 
price, is a function of the cash flows and rates of return that are expected over time.24 
There are three versions of the ECMH.  The weak form holds that securities prices reflect 
all information incorporated in past prices.  The semi-strong form of the ECMH holds 
that securities prices reflect all published information.  The strong form holds that prices 
reflect all discoverable information.25 If we limit our inquiry to changes in accounting 
standards and choices that involve only the presentation of published information, we 
need only accept the semi-strong version of the ECMH to conclude that accounting has 
no direct effect on stock valuation.26 The evidence suggests, and most economists 
believe, that markets are at least semi-strong efficient.27 
Lynn Stout, Lawrence Cunningham, and others have argued that markets may not 
be as efficient as economists generally presume,28 but I do not think that these criticisms 
undermine the modest claim made above.  Stout’s critique is primarily directed at 
assertions of strong form market efficiency and an even stronger view called fundamental 
value efficiency.29 The latter is the theory that prices not only reflect all available 
 
22 See Thomas D. Fields et al, Empirical Research on Accounting Choice, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON.
255, 279-81 (2001) (noting that research in the 1970s supported market efficiency, and that researchers in 
the 1980s and early 1990s assumed efficiency and looked for other explanations for why accounting would 
matter, i.e., positive accounting theory.  They note that some evidence produced in the 1990s is inconsistent 
with efficient markets and investor rationality, but conclude that the evidence is insufficient to draw strong 
inferences.) 
 Some accounting decisions, such as the choice between LIFO and FIFO inventory accounting, 
affect a firm’s tax burden and after-tax cash flow.  These accounting decisions would be expected to have 
share price implications under this theory.  See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text. 
23 See e.g., WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 72-73; Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 13, 
at 131, 133 (discussing accounting irrelevance theory).   
24 See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 72-73. 
25 See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 351 (7th 
ed. 2003).   
26 For example, suppose firms ABC and XYZ are identical except for their accounting for an 
expense of 10c per share.  ABC reports earnings of $1.00 per share and discloses the 10c per share expense 
in the footnotes to its accounting statements.  XYZ subtracts the expense in its income statement reporting 
earnings of 90c per share.  Under the naïve investor view that runs counter to the semi-strong ECMH, XYZ 
would trade for less than ABC.  Suppose that the price to earnings ratio for firms in this industry with 
prospects and risks similar to ABC and XYZ is 20.  Under the naïve investor view, ABC would trade at 
$20 per share, while XYZ would trade for $18 per share.  Because the expense is fully disclosed in both 
cases, the semi-strong version of the ECMH predicts that these firms would have an identical share price.  
The market would treat each as earning 90c per share.   
27 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, at 351-53.  Evidence that earnings and dividend 
announcements are almost fully incorporated into stock prices within five to ten minutes supports semi-
strong market efficiency.  See id. at 353. 
28 See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency:  An Introduction to the New 
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor 
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002). 
29 See Stout, supra note 28, at 637, 639 (describing the most common definition of an efficient 
market as one that reflects all available information) and Part II, generally (critiquing the fundamental 
value efficiency view). 
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information but also provide the best estimate of the fundamental value of the underlying 
asset.30 Fundamental value efficiency is quite hard to square with market corrections, so 
these criticisms are well taken.  But in considering the differential impact of competing 
accounting standards or of accounting choices, we are not concerned with fundamental 
equity values, only with the impact of accounting on stock prices relative to one another 
or from one period to another.  With regard to these issues, Stout argues that the cost of 
arbitrage and of acquiring and processing information, particularly technical information, 
undermines the efficiency with which information is impounded into prices.31 
Although I agree with Stout’s criticisms as applied to strong form market 
efficiency theory, and perhaps to some examples of semi-strong efficiency, I am skeptical 
of her argument that accounting practices affect stock prices because of informational 
inefficiency.  As an example of an accounting practice that may affect prices if markets 
are informationally inefficient, Stout mentions the debate over the treatment of 
compensatory stock options.32 This debate centers on whether stock option expense 
should be deducted from reported earnings in the body of the financial statement, as the 
FASB will now require,33 or detailed in the footnotes to the accounting statement.  It is 
important to recognize, however, that this “footnote” provides exactly the same 
information that will be provided in the body of company financial statements once the 
new rule takes effect.  Formerly, companies that did not “expense” options were required 
to present pro forma income statements revealing the net income and earnings per share 
figures that would have resulted had options been expensed.34 Thus, while I agree with 
Stout that the cost of acquiring and processing information can limit market efficiency in 
some circumstances, it is inconceivable to me that an income statement found on page 
three of the financial statement is any more informative than the exact same statement 
found on page thirty. 
 Of course, the stock option expensing example is the toughest case for those 
arguing that accounting standards affect stock prices because of informational 
inefficiencies.  Other changes to accounting standards could have greater impact on the 
information presented to investors.  I think we can safely say, however, that a change in 
standard that has no material effect on the information available to investors should have 
no direct effect on stock prices.   
 Similarly, it is difficult to understand how the accounting issue presented in 
Kamin could have any direct effect on the stock price of American Express.  Recall that 
the directors chose to distribute rather than sell depreciated securities the company was 
holding as an investment.35 Sale of the securities would have provided a potential $8 
 
30 See id. at 640. 
31 See id. at 651-56 and studies cited therein.  Stout also explores the effects of heterogeneous 
investor expectations and investor irrationality on efficient market claims, but these limitations on 
efficiency, if significant, pose less of a challenge to the semi-strong model.  See id., Parts II and IV. 
32 See id. at 657, n. 100. 
33 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.  
34 See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, supra note 6, para. 45.  Returning to 
the example in note 26 supra, if the 10c per share expense related to compensatory stock options, the 
footnoting option would allow ABC to report earnings of $1.00 per share in its income statement, but ABC 
would be required to report pro forma earnings of 90c per share in the footnotes to its financial statements.   
35 See Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809.  
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million tax benefit, but also would have reduced reported earnings by $26 million.36 
Perhaps if the directors had been able to hide the investment loss from analysts by 
distributing the securities, the impact on the price of American Express shares might have 
been dampened.  American Express stockholders, however, appeared to have been well 
aware of the economic loss that had been suffered.  The company had announced that the 
depreciated securities would be distributed in kind as a special dividend, and apparently 
the company had provided enough information for some of the shareholders to realize 
that this action would result in the company foregoing a sizeable tax benefit.  Ultimately, 
the board held a special meeting to reconsider distribution versus sale.  Can there be any 
doubt at this point that the economic loss suffered had been fully incorporated in the 
stock price of American Express and that the additional step of reducing corporate 
earnings by the amount of the loss would have provided no new information to the 
market?   
 There can be no real doubt.  Nonetheless, Lawrence Cunningham argues that the 
American Express directors still may have outsmarted the market by distributing the 
securities, and that their action reflected healthy skepticism about market efficiency.37 
The thrust of his and similar arguments is that investor cognitive biases, including loss 
aversion (the tendency to place greater importance on losses than gains), overconfidence 
(the belief that we are all better than average drivers, stock pickers, etc.), and availability 
(the tendency to place greater weight on more recent events) undermine the efficiency of 
the capital markets.38 However, Cunningham does not explain which cognitive bias 
would cause “market participants [to] focus on the income statement and earnings per 
share rather than on the balance sheet and owner’s equity,”39 and it is not obvious which, 
if any, cognitive bias would be at work here.  Perhaps some investors overconfidently 
rely on raw earnings numbers or rely excessively on reported earnings and discount 
footnotes and balance sheets because the former are more salient, but this sounds less like 
bias and more like laziness.  More generally, while there is evidence that market 
participants suffer from cognitive biases, it is not clear that these biases affect market 
prices.40 
B.  Positive Accounting Theory 
 
A believer in the semi-strong view of the ECMH might be tempted to conclude 
from the foregoing discussion that accounting standards and accounting choices are 
irrelevant, and this irrelevancy view held sway in the academic community for many 
 
36 See id. at 809-10. 
37 See Cunningham, supra note 28, at 823-24. 
38 See id. at 775 and 783.  See also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, at 358-59.  As Stout notes 
the behavioral finance field has experienced explosive growth.  I cite Cunningham as one example since he 
has specifically referenced the Kamin case, but many others could be cited.  See Stout, supra note 28, at 
660, n. 115-117. 
39 Cunningham, supra note 28, at 823-24. 
40 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, at 358-360 (questioning behavioral finance explanations 
for market anomalies and noting, inter alia, that financial institutions employ behavioral finance experts to 
assist them in overcoming these biases). 
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years.41 However, researchers investigating company choices among acceptable 
accounting alternatives found enough systematic variation to doubt the irrelevancy theory 
and seek alternative explanations.  For example, firm size and leverage (the ratio of 
corporate debt to equity) both appear to be associated with accounting choice, a result at 
odds with an irrelevancy view of accounting.42 Findings such as these have led 
researchers to search for indirect effects of accounting on share value, a field known as 
positive accounting theory.43 
The ECMH only says that the securities markets see through cosmetic accounting 
changes.  This does not necessarily mean that reported earnings are irrelevant.  Many 
corporate contracts are tied to reported earnings, including debt covenants and executive 
compensation agreements.44 Renegotiating these contracts to adjust for accounting 
changes can be costly, while failure to renegotiate in face of a purely accounting-driven 
change in earnings can be costly as well.45 In addition, if an accounting-driven increase 
in reported earnings is difficult to distinguish from an increase in profits arising from 
business fundamentals, the earnings bump could have political ramifications, such as 
increased exposure to tax hikes or reduced subsidies.46 Finally, mandatory accounting 
changes that reduce corporate freedom to select optimal accounting techniques could 
reduce the value of financial statements for private contracting.47 All of these indirect 
effects of reported earnings on share value are referred to in the positive accounting 
theory literature as contracting costs.  
 Transaction costs resulting from sticky contracts and political costs resulting from 
an apparent surge in profits affect a company’s cash flows.  Thus, this explanation is 
perfectly consistent with the ECMH and CAPM.  In developing the accounting 
irrelevance theory it had been assumed that accounting standards and practices did not 
affect transaction costs.  The advance made by positive accounting theorists has been to 
eliminate this simplifying assumption and begin to explain the relevance of accounting to 
share price.48 
Consider the impact of accounting on corporate debt covenants.  These covenants 
are based on GAAP accounting, which means that they are tied to reported earnings, and 
 
41 See Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 14, at 80 (discussing early tests finding no stock price 
reaction to changes in accounting techniques except for changes affecting taxes); Watts & Zimmerman, 
supra note 13, at 133. 
42 See Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 14, at 79. 
43 See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 13. 
44 See id. at 133.  See also Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 14, at 84-88. 
45 See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 215. 
46 See id. at 222-23. 
47 See id. at 219; Daniel W. Collins et al, The Economic Determinants of the Market Reaction to 
Proposed Mandatory Accounting Changes in the Oil and Gas Industry:  A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 3 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 37, 43 (1981).  In addition, a change in accounting standard may affect the reliability of 
information provided to the markets.  New standards that reduce reliability would have a negative effect on 
firm value by increasing contracting costs generally.  See Hassan Espahbodi et al, Impact on Equity Prices 
of Pronouncements Related to Nonpension Postretirement Benefits, 14 J. ACCT. & ECON. 323, 327 (1991). 
48 There is an obvious analogy between the evolution of positive accounting theory and positive 
finance theory.  Miller and Modigliani demonstrated in 1961 that corporate financing decisions, such as 
dividend payout policies, are irrelevant in the absence of transaction costs.  See M. H. Miller & F. 
Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961).  Subsequent 
researchers demonstrated that taxes, agency costs, and other imperfections in the market render corporate 
finance relevant.  See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 25, ch 16. 
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they usually are based on “rolling” GAAP, that is, GAAP in effect at the time of 
calculation.49 Renegotiation of debt covenants can be difficult and costly, particularly 
covenants associated with publicly held debt which generally require a two-thirds vote of 
the outstanding debt for amendment.50 Violation of debt covenants can be costly as well, 
resulting in restrictions on the payment of dividends, limitations on merger activity, and 
other adverse consequences.51 Thus, an accounting choice, an operational decision, or a 
mandatory change in accounting standards that reduces earnings, even if the earnings 
reduction is completely cosmetic, reduces firm value by increasing the risk of costly debt 
covenant violation.  As Richard Leftwich points out, reduction in firm value should not 
exceed the lesser of the cost of renegotiating the covenants, redeeming the debt (if 
possible), default, or adjusting operations to avoid default.52 Unless renegotiation is 
costless, however, an income-reducing accounting change will reduce the value of a firm 
with outstanding debt to some extent.   
 However, the various contracting costs that have been identified do not all run in 
the same direction.  There are various stories about the effect of accounting and earnings 
changes on regulation.  Watts and Zimmerman postulate that firms would wish to keep 
reported earnings low to stave off tax increases, suggesting that income-reducing 
standard changes or accounting choices would reduce political costs.53 If renegotiation of 
executive compensation agreements is costly, mandatory accounting changes that reduce 
reported earnings will be resisted by management, but the effect on firm value is 
ambiguous.  At one level reducing reported earnings in an environment of sticky 
compensation contracts should increase firm value by reducing compensation payments.  
On the other hand, reducing incentive compensation could adversely affect firm value.  
The optimal contracting story has no directional prediction.  Under this theory, 
mandatory standard changes that reduce accounting choices reduce firm value whether 
the new standard results in higher or lower reported earnings.54 
C.  Shareholder and Manager Appetite for Earnings 
 
In the absence of transaction costs, cosmetic accounting changes would have no 
impact on share value, and loyal directors would simply ignore the impact of their 
decisions on reported earnings.  The decision to sacrifice cash flow for earnings, as in 
Kamin, would clearly run counter to shareholder interests.  Once we introduce positive 
accounting theory, however, the picture is more complex.  Assuming that contracting 
costs are non-trivial, loyal managers would need to balance earnings effects against other 
cash flow effects, and even cosmetic changes in accounting could affect share value.   
 Let’s assume that debt covenant costs dominate other contracting costs so that a 
reduction in reported earnings resulting from operational decisions or a mandatory 
 
49 See Richard Leftwich, Evidence of the Impact of Mandatory Changes in Accounting Principles 
on Corporate Loan Agreements, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 6 (1981). 
50 See id. at 8. 
51 See id. at 6. 
52 See id. at 7. 
53 See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 231.  Cf. Simon Romero & Edmund L. Andrews, 
At Exxon Mobil, a Record Profit but No Fanfare, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2006) (covering Exxon Mobil’s 
announcement of a record $36 billion in annual profits and efforts by the company to play down the news). 
54 See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 219. 
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change in accounting standards reduces firm value.  Share value maximization would 
require managers to take these costs into account.  But there are conflicting forces.  As in 
Kamin, steps taken to increase reported earnings often result in increased taxes, and vice 
versa.  A proposed change in accounting standards may decrease reported earnings and 
increase the expected cost of default on debt covenants, but opposing the change may 
entail monetary and perhaps political costs.  Thus, while shareholders will have some 
appetite for accounting-induced increases in reported earnings, this appetite will be 
tempered by other costs.  Share value will be maximized by maximizing after-tax cash 
flow, but this requires striking a balance between the contracting costs associated with 
reported earnings and other cash flow effects.  The optimal point on the continuum 
between earnings maximization and maximization of other cash flows will depend on 
firm characteristics.  For example, firms that are highly leveraged will face relatively 
greater costs from reduced reported earnings.  Of course, even calculating the optimal 
point along this continuum is costly, and for some firms share value may indeed be 
maximized by simply ignoring the effect of reported earnings (perhaps the case for 
unleveraged companies) or by maximizing reported earnings and ignoring cash flow 
(unlikely, but conceivably the case for highly leveraged firms in the vicinity of 
insolvency).   
In a world without agency costs, managers’ appetite for reported earnings would 
mirror that of shareholders, but in the real world, we should expect managers to have a 
stronger appetite for earnings than shareholders.  First, and most obviously, managerial 
compensation may depend on reported earnings, independent of the effect of earnings on 
share price.  Accounting-based bonuses have a long pedigree and remain common 
today.55 Reported earnings often factor into managerial bonuses both as an element in 
bonus calculations and as a ceiling on bonus payouts.56 In recent years, of course, equity-
based compensation has grown to overshadow traditional bonuses (although accounting-
based bonuses generally have not been reduced, much to the consternation of corporate 
pay critics).57 However, the latest trend is to tie receipt of equity-based pay to accounting 
performance, increasing the sensitivity of managerial compensation to financial 
accounting.  Thirty percent of major U.S. corporations recently surveyed by Mercer 
Consulting based a portion of CEO equity compensation on the achievement of 
accounting-based performance targets.58 For example, stock option grants increasingly 
 
55 See Susan Eichen & Eric Scoones, Annual Incentive Plan Design Considerations, in EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 35, 37, 49-50 (Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002) (noting that “vast majority” 
of U.S. companies maintain annual incentive plans and that financial measures of performance, principally 
income-based measures, are among the most commonly used metrics in these plans). 
56 See JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, ACCOUNTING FOR DECISION MAKING AND CONTROL 185 (1995). 
57 According to a recent study, equity-based compensation accounted for 72% of total 
compensation paid to the top five executives of S&P 500 companies in 2000 and 2001, and then declined to 
55% of total compensation for 2003, the last year of data reported.  This study also found that although 
average equity-based pay received by CEOs of S&P 500, Mid-Cap 500, and Small-Cap 600 companies 
about tripled between 1993 and 2003, cash compensation still increased by about 40% across this period.  
See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY 
283, 290-92 (2005).  
58 See Joann S. Lublin, Boards Tie CEO Pay More Tightly to Performance; Options Grants May 
Depend on Meeting Financial Goals: Moving Beyond a “Pulse”, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2006, at A1. 
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are made contingent on a corporation’s achievement of earnings, revenue growth, or 
other financial targets.59 
In addition, high reported income may have an indirect effect on a manager’s 
compensation.  Even if information presentation has no direct effect on stock prices and 
little or no direct effect on compensation, managers may be able to use high reported 
earnings as a factor in negotiating additional compensation.  Compensation consultants 
working for senior executives are masters at identifying the metrics that allow their 
bosses to report better than average performance, justifying higher than average 
compensation.60 Artificially inflating reported earnings is one way to shine relative to 
one’s peers. 
Positive accounting theorists have long recognized that managers of firms with 
earnings-based bonuses will tend to choose earnings-increasing accounting practices and 
favor earnings-increasing standards.61 The more general point that even executives of 
companies that lack explicit earnings-based bonuses will share these motivations has not 
been widely recognized in the accounting literature, perhaps because it is a difficult 
proposition to test.  However, it is important to recognize the difference between this 
story and the contracting and political cost stories.  Assuming that accounting-induced 
increases in executive compensation do not provide commensurate increases in 
productivity, an earnings-increasing change in accounting standards or practices tends to 
reduce share value because of the increased compensation payout.  But despite the 
reduction in share value, the executive decision makers may very well favor the change 
because they receive a portion of the increased compensation that results.  Here there is a 
divergence of interests between managers and shareholders that does not arise in 
examining the impact of reported earnings on debt contracts or political costs. This is still 
a transaction cost story, but in the agency cost vein.62 
Second, in some cases, managers may care less about the compensatory effects of 
reported earnings per se, and more about the increased exposure to scrutiny of certain 
elements of their compensation.  The FASB’s decision to require companies to shift stock 
option expense reporting from footnote to front page will reduce reported earnings and 
thus will reduce earnings-based bonuses and could have negative effects on other forms 
of compensation.  But perhaps more importantly, the new reporting requirement makes 
option compensation more visible to corporate critics and shareholder advocates, which 
may result in pressure on directors to limit options.63 Thus, resistance to stock option 
expensing may appear to reflect a stronger managerial appetite for earnings than truly 
exists. 
 
59 See id. 
60 See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 42-50 (1991); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 71 (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al, Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 790-91 (2002). 
61 See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 138; WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 256. 
62 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (seminal article on the 
manager/shareholder agency problem). 
63 See Dechow et al, supra note 9, discussed infra Part II.C. (empirical study indicating that 
managerial resistance to stock option expensing proposal was driven by concerns relating to the scrutiny of 
option compensation), Bebchuk et al, supra note 60 (developing a managerial power model of executive 
compensation and arguing that salience is a critical factor limiting compensation).  For further discussion, 
see infra notes 106-111 and accompanying text. 
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Third, some managers may hold an honest, but mistaken belief that information 
presentation directly affects stock prices.  They may subscribe to the naïve investor view 
of the market that runs counter to the semi-strong version of the ECMH, and holds that 
investors take earnings at face value and reward firms that report high earnings with high 
share prices.  Obviously, managers that honestly thought that reported earnings directly 
affected their stock price would place a high value on increasing those earnings. 
Fourth, managers may be socialized into placing inordinate importance on 
earnings, achieving earnings targets, and maintaining steady earnings improvements by 
the focus of stock analysts on these metrics.  Of course, all else being equal, higher 
earnings should translate into a higher stock price.  One can easily imagine, however, that 
over time high earnings could become a goal in and of itself.  
There are no obvious reasons why managers would have less of an appetite for 
earnings than shareholders, or at least no systematic reasons.64 At times, accounting 
results may provide an excuse or cover for managers to achieve other objectives, and 
excuses may be predicated on earnings-decreasing changes in accounting.  For example, 
a 1990 change in accounting for post-retirement health care benefits resulted in a 
substantial increase in reported expenses.65 The implementation of this change was 
followed by massive cuts in these benefits.  The accounting change may have provided 
the political cover needed to implement these cuts.  However, this Machiavellian story is 
undermined by the observation that managers vociferously opposed the adoption of this 
accounting standard.66 Moreover, the excuse theory works both ways.  As noted above, 
managerial resistance to stock option expensing, an earnings-decreasing change, may 
have arisen in part from a desire to minimize the salience of managerial compensation.   
Given the directional ambiguity of the accounting-as-excuse story and all the 
other reasons for managers to have a stronger appetite for earnings than shareholders, we 
should expect the distribution of managerial preferences along the continuum between 
maximizing reported earnings and maximizing other cash flows to be skewed in the 
direction of earnings maximization, relative to shareholder preferences.  Assuming a 
divergence between shareholder and manager preferences, how do firms respond in 
situations in which earnings and cash flow concerns conflict?  The resolution depends on 
the severity of the managerial agency problem in any given firm, which is a function of 
incentives and corporate governance.67 Perversely, managers of firms that have more 
 
64 Depending on bonus plan structure, managers may have an incentive to reduce reported 
earnings in a particular period.  Imagine that a manager’s annual bonus opportunity is dependent on 
company earnings exceeding a particular threshold and that it becomes obvious that the threshold will not 
be exceeded for year X.  In that case, the manager has an incentive to accelerate expenses from year X+1 to 
year X.  Taking a “big bath” in year X will have no impact on her bonus for that year, but will increase the 
likelihood of exceeding the earnings threshold and receiving a bonus for year X+1.  See, e.g., Timothy W. 
Koch & Larry D. Wall, The Use of Accruals to Manage Reported Earnings: Theory and Evidence (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper, Nov. 2000).  Note, however, that the “big bath” phenomenon 
does not suggest that managers would prefer earnings-reducing accounting standard changes.  On balance, 
managers prefer to report high earnings. 
65 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.   
66 See Stephen A. Zeff, The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces Behind the Professional 
Standards, THE CPA J., Feb. 2005, at 25-26 (recounting strong opposition by industry to this change in 
accounting standards but noting that “afterwards, companies conceded its constructive effect on their 
decision making.”). 
67 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 62; Bebchuk et al, supra note 62.  
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closely linked executive pay to earnings in order to align managerial incentives with 
those of shareholders are more likely to sacrifice cash flow for reported earnings.68 But 
among firms with similar pay practices, we should expect better governed firms to more 
closely track shareholder preferences and exhibit relatively less appetite for earnings 
relative to more poorly governed firms.  In fact, one can imagine that in many cases 
shareholder preferences for earnings per se are negligible, while managerial preferences 
are considerable, leading to quite different earnings management behavior between well 
and poorly governed firms.  I am not aware of any empirical evidence on this point, and it 
seems fertile ground for further research.  We turn now, however, to consider empirical 
evidence on the general topic of the behavioral impact of financial accounting. 
 
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ACCOUNTING, SHARE VALUE, AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
Positive accounting theory provides a rational basis for believing that accounting 
standards and practices matter, and the empirical evidence generally supports this view.  
Managers and corporations act as if accounting mattered, and we observe that accounting 
choices vary systematically between firms.  Unfortunately, the empirical evidence 
supporting details of positive accounting theory is mixed, at best.  Evidence of stock price 
reaction to accounting changes has been found in some studies, but a recent survey of the 
empirical literature concludes that this evidence is not strong.  Managerial and corporate 
reaction to accounting changes provides stronger evidence of positive accounting theory.  
Much of this evidence, however, is as consistent with a manager-driven theory of 
accounting choice as it is with positive accounting theory.  None of the evidence is 
inconsistent with the semi-strong view of the ECMH. 
 
A.  Stock Price Reaction to Changes in Mandatory Accounting Standards 
 
If one is looking for real world effects of accounting, the most obvious place to 
start is with changes in mandatory standards and market reaction to those changes.  
Indeed, some studies have found stock price reactions to changes in mandatory 
accounting standards.  For example, in 1990 FASB implemented Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 106 (SFAS 106), which replaced pay-as-you-go accounting 
for post-retirement health care benefits with accrual accounting.69 This shift reduced 
reported earnings for companies offering such benefits.  One study of SFAS 106 
implementation found that the release of the exposure draft document formally proposing 
the standard change resulted in a 3% share price drop for the firms in their sample.70 This 
result appears to provide evidence for the contracting cost hypothesis, and specifically the 
 
68 This phenomenon demonstrates the intractability of the managerial agency problem.  As with 
the arcade game “Whac-a-Mole,” efforts to combat shirking, excessive perquisite consumption and similar 
agency problems by tying executive pay to financial results can result in unexpected agency problems 
popping up elsewhere. 
69 See Espahbodi et al, supra note 47. 
70 See id. at 324, 341.  Sample firms offering post-retirement benefits experienced a 3% abnormal 
negative return compared to a control group of firms not offering such benefits.  The authors also found 
that the negative impact of the new standard on stock prices varied cross-sectionally as expected; e.g., the 
effect was more pronounced for firms that were at greater risk of default as evidenced by high debt to 
equity ratios. 
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debt covenant hypothesis:  Reduced earnings as a result of SFAS 106 implementation 
would increase the risk of costly default.71 
By contrast, a study of share price reaction to several key FASB announcements 
pertaining to stock option expensing found no evidence of systematic market reaction to 
these announcements.72 Expensing of stock options would reduce reported earnings and 
result in a stock price decrease if the debt covenant effect were dominant.  Thus, 
announcements signaling an increasing/decreasing likelihood of expensing should have 
resulted in reduced/increased share prices. 
In their 1986 book on positive accounting theory, Watts and Zimmerman report 
that studies investigating stock price reactions to mandated changes in accounting 
procedures support the theory, but they admit that the associations between variables are 
inconsistent across studies.73 A more recent survey article reviewing twenty six studies 
of mandated accounted changes published in the top three accounting journals during the 
1980s, concluded that in aggregate these studies provided little or no evidence of stock 
price effects.  The author concluded that the effects were small.74 It is also possible, 
however, that the effects are significant, but difficult to detect because accounting 
standard changes are not announced out of the blue.   
Watts and Zimmerman note that stock price change studies are relatively weak 
tests of positive accounting theory.75 The weakness arises in part because of the 
difficulty of isolating accounting change announcements that surprise the market.76 If 
one accepts at least the semi-strong version of the ECMH, the actual reporting of higher 
or lower earnings as a result of a change in accounting standard should have no effect on 
stock prices. 77 The market sees through this.  The effect on firm value and stock price 
arises from sticky contracts and the effect of a change in reported earnings on those 
contracts.  Once the market gets wind of a coming change in standards, however, the 
market can predict the impact of that change on contracting costs in advance of its 
implementation.  Thus, assuming that a standard change is merely cosmetic and has no 
effect on the information available to the marketplace, the impact of the coming change 
should be fully incorporated in stock prices when the market is confident that the change 
 
71 See id. The authors also speculated that SFAS 106 may have increased contracting costs 
generally, by making a poor tradeoff between timeliness and reliability of information provided to the 
marketplace.  Accrual accounting is more timely than pay-as-you-go, but accrual accounting involves 
estimation that was not necessary under the former standard.  See id. at 327. 
72 See Dechow et al, supra note 9, at 16.  The events tested were the 1993 announcement that the 
FASB had voted to mandate stock option expensing, the release of the exposure draft mandating expensing 
about three months later, and the subsequent announcement that the FASB would drop mandatory 
expensing in favor of voluntary expensing and mandatory footnoting.  The study did find significant 
management reaction to the expensing proposal in the form of comment letters to the SEC objecting to 
option expensing. 
73 See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 311. 
74 See V.L. Bernard, Capital Market Research in Accounting During the 1980s:  A Critical 
Review, from the State of Accounting Research as We Enter the 1990s (cited in Fields et al, supra note 22, 
at 264). 
75 See Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 138. 
76 See Leftwich, supra note 49, at 9-10. 
77 This assumes that there is no change in publicly available information.  If the accounting change 
were to make public previously non-public material information, the post-change earnings reports would be 
informative and would affect stock prices. 
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will be implemented.  As a result, researchers looking for evidence of market reaction to 
accounting changes focus on FASB exposure drafts or other announcements of proposed 
changes.  But a price effect would be expected only when the market is surprised.  
Accounting standard changes that are suggested, debated, announced, revised and re-
announced may not result in the degree of surprise that would result in a statistically 
significant stock price change even if the contracting cost story is right.78 
It is worth noting, however, that there is no evidence that the implementation of 
an accounting standard change impacts stock prices.  Researchers investigating SFAS 
106 implementation, for example, generally agree that the market had fully incorporated 
the change into stock prices prior to implementation.79 This evidence is consistent with 
semi-strong market efficiency.  Under a naïve investor view of the market, stock prices 
should have been reduced on the promulgation of earnings statements applying the new 
standard. 
 
B.  Corporate Response to Changes in Mandatory Accounting Standards 
 
Given the difficulty of isolating price responses to accounting standard changes, 
some studies have focused instead on corporate reaction to these changes.  These studies 
reinforce the view that accounting matters and provide limited support for the positive 
accounting theory explanation. 
For example, SFAS 106, which engineered the switch from pay-as-you-go 
accounting for post-retirement health care benefits to accrual accounting, had a dramatic 
effect on firm behavior.80 Companies reacted to the new standard by slashing post-
retirement health care benefits.  One study of SFAS 106 implementation found a tight 
cluster of benefit cuts around the adoption date following 10 years in which cuts were 
rare,81 and concluded that the “data indicate a strong associative relation between the 
decision to cut retiree health care benefits and the requirement to adopt SFAS No. 106.”82 
The authors of this study also found evidence supportive of the contracting cost 
hypothesis.  They found that cuts in benefits were related to the extent to which a firm 
was leveraged prior to adoption of SFAS 106 (a proxy for the tightness of debt 
covenants) and the extent to which adoption increased that leverage (which proxied for 
the increased risk of covenant violation).83 
78 See Holthausen & Leftwich, supra note 14, at 105.   
79 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 49, 66 (2003) (summarizing studies); see also H. Fred Mittelstaedt et al, SFAS No. 106 and 
Benefit Reductions in Employer-Sponsored Retiree Health Care Plans, 70 ACCT. REV. 535, 539 (1995) 
(asking “why managers reduce[d] benefits as a result of SFAS No. 106 if security prices fully reflect[ed] 
retiree health care liabilities prior to its adoption”). 
80 See Mittelstaedt et al, supra note 79. 
81 See id. at 548, tbl 2.  Of course, we need to be concerned about causation and potential omitted 
variable problems.  See Ray Ball, Discussion of Accounting for Research and Development Costs:  The 
Impact on Research and Development Expenditures, 18 J. ACCT. RES. 27, 37 (1980) (warning that 
accounting change studies are suspect because they treat the imposition of a new standard as exogenous, 
when in fact the new standard, corporate reaction, and stock price changes all may be related to an omitted 
environmental change). 
82 See Mittelstaedt et al, supra note 79, at 554. 
83 See id. at 542-543, 552. 
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However, as suggested above, some observers believe that the relationship 
between the promulgation of SFAS 106 and benefit cuts is better explained as political 
cover.84 Accrual accounting for these benefits massively increased the expense reported 
in company financial statements and allowed companies slashing benefits to place the 
blame on the accountants.85 Thus, it is difficult to determine the relative contributions of 
contracting costs, political cover, and managerial fixation with reported earnings towards 
the clear corporate behavioral response to SFAS 106. 
Similar results were found in an earlier study that investigated corporate response 
to SFAS 13, which moved capital lease disclosures from financial statement footnotes 
onto corporate balance sheets.86 This move had the effect of increasing debt and 
reducing reported income, increasing leverage and decreasing reported rates of return.87 
From either a contracting cost or managerial compensation perspective, this was an 
unwelcome change.  Increased leverage increased the risk of debt covenant default, and 
managerial compensation often is tied, implicitly or explicitly, to accounting rates of 
return.88 Thus, the authors predicted (and found) that firms would respond by reducing 
their reliance on capital leases and shifting to operating leases that had better accounting 
characteristics.89 Although the authors demonstrated corporate sensitivity to the negative 
accounting standard change, they did not test for the positive accounting theory 
explanations. 
 
C.  Stock Option Expense Accounting 
 
Of course, the highest profile change in accounting standards to occur in some 
time was the adoption of mandatory stock option expensing, which is coming into effect 
in 2005 and 2006.90 Many experts predict that this change will result in a significant 
adjustment in compensation practices, although it is much too early to say.  A study of 
corporate lobbying against the rule’s adoption, however, indicates that opposition was 
driven by management concerns unrelated to real economic effects.91 Before turning to 
this study, however, let us consider another behavioral aspect of the stock option story.  
As noted above, until 2005 standard compensatory stock options resulted in no reduction 
in reported earnings, ever, although the compensation expense has been reported in 
footnotes to earnings statements since 1995.  Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests 
that this anomalous accounting treatment was a primary factor in the growing use of 
options in the 1990s.  Less clear, however, is whether positive accounting theory or self-
 
84 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
85 See Mittelstaedt et al, supra note 79, at 538-539. 
86 See Eugene A. Imhoff, Jr. & Jacob K. Thomas, Economic Consequences of Accounting 
Standards:  The Lease Disclosure Rule Change, 10 J. ACCT. & ECON. 277 (1988). 
87 See id. at 279. 
88 See id.
89 See id. at 278. 
90 Companies (other than small businesses) are required to record option compensation as an 
expense in fiscal years beginning on or after June 15, 2005.  See SEC Release No. 33-8568.  Thus, a 
company with a fiscal year beginning on June 1 would not be required to report option compensation as an 
expense until late in 2006.   
91 See DeChow et al, supra note 9.   
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serving managerial behavior better explains the incentive effect of stock options 
accounting.   
 Practitioners and practice-oriented academics are uniformly of the view that the 
accounting treatment of stock options is important to executives and has contributed to 
the explosion in their use.  Kevin Murphy, a financial economist and noted executive 
compensation expert, argues that the increasing prevalence in the 1990s of broad-based 
stock option plans granting a majority of options to employees below the very top ranks 
is evidence of option overuse, since only the top executives are in position to 
significantly influence the firm’s stock price.92 Murphy attributes excessive use of 
options to management misperception that options represent inexpensive compensation.93 
That misperception is based on the fact that options require no cash outlay (although this 
is also true of stock compensation, which is far less prevalent) and on the fact that, until 
recently, options did not reduce reported earnings.94 Murphy does not believe that the 
accounting treatment of options has a direct effect on share prices or that management 
fixation on compensation accounting is based solely on share price effects.95 “[B]ased on 
countless discussions (often heated arguments) with compensation consultants, 
practitioners, and executives, [Murphy] is convinced that … this fixation reflects more 
than the effect of accounting rules on stock prices.”96 
Murphy believes that “companies would respond … dramatically to changes in 
the accounting treatment of stock options.”97 As evidence, Murphy cites data 
demonstrating that the practice of explicitly reducing the exercise prices of outstanding 
stock options following market downturns came to an abrupt halt at the end of 1998 when 
new accounting rules required firms to expense repriced options.98 
Similarly, Brian Hall and Jeff Liebman echo the view of practitioners that 
accounting treatment is an important factor in option plan design.99 They report that 
companies often fail to seriously consider stock option plans that have “bad accounting,” 
i.e., result in compensation expense recognition.100 
Although somewhat mixed, there is a growing body of empirical evidence linking 
stock option use to its favorable accounting treatment.  Because the accounting treatment 
of conventional stock options was consistent up to 2005, cross sectional analyses have 
been employed seeking to establish a relationship between option use and the degree to 
which companies are concerned with financial reporting results.  Sensitivity to reported 
earnings sometimes is estimated directly by looking at variables such as interest coverage 
or retained earnings.  Low interest coverage increases the probability of violating debt 
covenants and limited retained earnings are likely to result in dividend constraints.  These 
 
92 See Murphy, supra note 8, at 857-58. 
93 See id. at 859.  See also Hall & Murphy, supra note 79, at 66 (arguing that the result of 
underestimating the true cost of stock options “is that too many options will be granted to too many people, 
and options with favorable accounting treatment will be preferred to (perhaps better) incentive plans with 
less favorable accounting”). 
94 See Murphy, supra note 8, at 857-58. 
95 See id. at 860. 
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See id. at 861-62. 
99 See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation 6, NBER 
working paper no. 7596 (Mar. 2000). 
100 See id.
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variables are consistent with positive accounting theory and specifically the contracting 
cost theory.   Other studies determine earnings sensitivity indirectly by looking for other 
evidence of earnings management, such as how consistently a firm beats analyst earnings 
forecasts.  Although these latter studies tell us something about earnings sensitivity, they 
tell us little about positive accounting theory.  Earnings sensitivity in these cases could be 
driven by self-serving managerial behavior rather than contracting costs. 
Of three studies focusing exclusively on option grants to CEOs, only one found 
significant evidence that accounting drives option use.101 However, two studies of broad-
based option plans both support the view that accounting drives option use, as well as the 
contracting cost explanation.  First, an analysis of all options granted to employees by 
123 firms over an eleven year period found a positive relationship between the use of 
options and other earnings management techniques and between option use and dividend 
constraints.102 And a more recent examination of option grants to executives reported in 
the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database yielded the conclusion “that what is 
driving the use of options in non-CEO compensation is not the need to realign incentives, 
but the desire to avoid the expense.”103 
Although CEOs typically receive the largest option grants within their companies, 
CEO options typically represent a small percentage of total options granted.104 
Accordingly, the earnings effect of CEO options alone would be small in comparison to 
the effect of paying employees with options generally, and it is not surprising that studies 
looking at broad-based option plans are more informative.  Of course, the ultimate test of 
the importance of option accounting to option use will be in the response of companies to 
the new option expensing requirement.  Already, there is anecdotal evidence of a shift 
away from options in favor of other forms of equity compensation, such as restricted 
stock, but it is too early to draw firm conclusions.105 
The evidence suggests that the pre-2005 stock option accounting rules served as a 
successful, although unintended, accounting incentive.  Even if one accepts this 
conclusion, however, one can ask whether we can generalize from this.  There is some 
evidence consistent with a positive accounting theory explanation for accounting-driven 
option use, but other evidence simply indicates that accounting matters, without really 
 
101 Compare John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity 
Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 173 (1999) (finding a significant and positive relationship 
between option use and dividend constraints) with David Yermack, Do Corporations Award CEO Stock 
Options Effectively?, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 264 (1995) (finding no significant relationship between option 
use and financial reporting costs) and with Stephen Bryan et al, CEO Stock-Based Compensation:  An 
Empirical Analysis on Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants, 73 J. BUS. 661, 683 
(2000) (finding evidence of a significant link between options use and some measures of financial reporting 
costs, but not others). 
102 See Steven R. Matsunaga, The Effects of Financial Reporting Costs on the Use of Employee 
Stock Options, 70 ACCT. REV. 1, 23 (1995). 
103 Mary Ellen Carter et al, The Role of Incentives and Accounting in the Design of Executive 
Compensation Packages 24 (working paper, Aug. 2004) (emphasis in original). 
104 See, e.g., Hall & Murphy, supra note 79, at 51 (finding that the value of options granted to 
CEOs of S&P 500 firms averaged about 7% of the total value of options granted in the mid-1990’s, but had 
fallen to less that 5% in 2000 to 2002). 
105 See Michael S. Knoll, Restricted Stock and the Section 83(b) Election:  A Joint Tax Perspective 
2 (working paper, Aug. 2005) (citing survey evidence indicating a shift from stock options to restricted 
stock). 
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telling us why.  Moreover, there is an additional reason to suspect that self-serving 
managerial behavior played an important role in the use of options under the pre-2005 
accounting regime.  Managers may care excessively about reported earnings generally, 
but even if they do not, they might prefer that stock options not be expensed (and might 
over-rely on options given the pre-2005 accounting treatment), because “footnoting” 
option compensation helped to camouflage their own compensation.    
 Two colleagues and I have argued that U.S. executive compensation practices 
reflect in large part a managerial power view of corporate governance.106 Under this 
theory, executive compensation is not set by efficient contracting, but is largely 
controlled by the managers themselves, subject to market forces and to investor and 
financial press outrage that tends to constrain directors and the managers themselves.107 
Under this theory, compensation transparency is the manager’s enemy, and compensation 
channels that are less visible or camouflaged will be preferred.108 
There is some evidence that accounting camouflage plays a role in stock option 
use.  Although options are often granted far down into the employee ranks, the value of 
options often is concentrated at the very top.  One study found evidence that corporate 
opposition to the 1993 FASB proposal to mandate stock option expensing was driven by 
top executives’ concerns relating to the scrutiny of their compensation and not by real 
economic effects.109 Specifically, the study found that top executives of companies 
submitting comment letters to the FASB opposing the change tended to receive a greater 
fraction of their total pay through options and more pay in total than executives of similar 
non-commenting firms.110 In addition, it found that option programs were more “top 
heavy” in commenting firms relative to their non-commenting peers.111 This evidence 
suggests that the stock option accounting “incentive” may have been more effective than 
simple earnings fixation would suggest.   
 
D.  Voluntary Accounting Choice Evidence - Tax/Earnings Tradeoffs 
 
Every day, managers make choices between permissible accounting techniques 
and make operational decisions that have significant accounting consequences.  The 
choice to employ stock options in lieu of other forms of compensation provides one 
example of voluntary accounting choice writ large.  Studies of voluntary accounting 
choices demonstrate that accounting is not irrelevant.  This literature is voluminous.  
Instead of attempting to provide an overview, I will direct the reader to any of several 
good survey articles noted in the margin,112 and focus here, by way of example, on the 
literature examining company tradeoffs between minimizing taxes and boosting reported 
earnings.  This literature is typical of voluntary accounting choice studies, demonstrates 
accounting relevance, and provides some evidence of positive accounting theory.   
 
106 See Bebchuk et al, supra note 60; see also BEBCHUK AND FRIED, supra note 60. 
107 See Bebchuk et al, supra note 60, at 786-88. 
108 See id. at 789. 
109 See Dechow et al, supra note 9, at 2. 
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See Fields et al, supra note 22; Douglas A. Shackleford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax 
Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 321 (2001). 
ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
24 
 Although financial and tax accounting rules differ in many respects, managers 
often face a conflict between minimizing taxes and maximizing earnings.  Actions that 
reduce taxable income and taxes often result in lower financial statement income as well.  
If accounting were irrelevant, we would expect managers to ignore reported earnings and 
minimize taxes in order to maximize after tax cash flow.  Instead, we often see managers 
sacrificing cash flow for reported earnings improvements.   
The Kamin case, discussed above, is a prime anecdotal example of this effect.  
There, recall, the directors apparently forewent potential tax savings of $8 million to 
avoid a $26 million reduction in reported earnings.113 The decision to distribute the 
depreciated securities to the shareholders rather than sell them and distribute the cash 
proceeds in Kamin apparently had no other consequence.     
We should be careful not to read too much into this example.  First, the case was 
decided on a summary judgment motion made by the American Express defendants, 
which required the judge to accept the facts as presented by the plaintiffs.  Normally, we 
should be highly suspicious of the facts presented in this circumstance.  However, the 
opinion suggests that minutes of the relevant directors’ meeting essentially confirmed the 
facts alleged by the plaintiffs.114 Second, this is a single isolated case.  Nonetheless, 
practitioners generally are not surprised by the action of the American Express board in 
this case and find it consistent with their experience.115 It is also consistent with 
empirical studies of asset divestitures, as discussed below. 
 If the facts are taken as given in the opinion, the Kamin case squarely presents a 
tradeoff between tax savings and earnings management.  Although somewhat less clean, 
two empirical studies of asset divestitures support the view that managers sacrifice tax 
benefits and cash flow to boost earnings when disposing of assets, but provide only 
limited support for positive accounting theory.  One study investigated taxable sales 
versus non-taxable spin-offs of corporate subsidiaries.116 Just as the American Express 
directors faced a choice between selling the depreciated securities and distributing them 
to shareholders, directors of a company wishing to dispose of a subsidiary can sell it or 
distribute its stock to shareholders through a spin-off.  If managers focused solely on tax 
minimization, they would spin-off subsidiaries if a sale would result in a taxable gain and 
sell subsidiaries if a sale would result in a tax loss.  Instead, this study demonstrated that 
managers routinely incurred avoidable tax costs or forwent potential tax benefits in 
structuring divestments.117 Of course, there could be many reasons other than tax and 
financial reporting considerations for structuring a divestment as a sale or spin-off – a 
sale generates cash, while a spin-off does not; a sale may yield a premium price if the 
asset is worth more in the hands of the buyer.  Nonetheless, the evidence was consistent 
with the view that managers trade off tax against earnings, and the authors estimated that 
firms were willing to incur $0.19 of extra tax costs to boost earnings by $1.118 This study 
 
113 See Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 809-810. 
114 See id.
115 See, e.g., Conversations from the Warren Buffet Symposium (Lawrence A. Cunningham, ed.), 
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 794-800 (1997) (discussing Kamin and more egregious examples of the 
phenomenon). 
116 See Edward L. Maydew et al, The Impact of Taxes on the Choice of Divestiture Method, 28 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 117 (1999). 
117 See id. at 120. 
118 See id. at 146. 
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provided little evidence of positive accounting theory.  The results were only “weakly 
consistent” with a contracting cost variables.119 
Another study of major asset divestitures confirms that managers weigh both 
taxes and the impact on reported income in making divestitures.120 This study finds that 
firms with greater inside ownership concentration are less likely to sacrifice tax benefits 
in an effort to boost reported earnings.121 The author suggests that high inside ownership 
concentration reduces capital market pressures on a firm.  That may be so, but it is 
unclear how this reduced capital market pressure fits into positive accounting theory.  
That theory holds that shareholders are sensitive to earnings because of sticky contracts 
based on those earnings.  Perhaps high inside ownership concentration reduces the cost of 
renegotiating executive compensation contracts, but it is unclear what effect inside 
ownership would have on debt covenants, which most researchers consider the dominant 
factor.  It seems much more plausible that firms with high inside ownership focus more 
on after-tax cash flow, because manager and shareholder interests are more closely 
aligned.  This evidence supports the view that the appetite for earnings found in many of 
these studies is driven by manager preferences in lieu of or in addition to shareholder 
preferences consistent with positive accounting theory.   
Kamin and the asset disposition studies certainly demonstrate management 
sensitivity to reported earnings.  But these cases involve discrete, one time events, and 
questions of investment, disposition, or payout policy, not day-to-day operations.  One 
may question whether earnings effects influence corporate behavior with respect to more 
day-to-day operational decisions. 
 A number of studies have evaluated how firms trade off tax minimization against 
financial reporting considerations with respect to routine, day-to-day activities.  One 
review study summed up the evidence as follows:  “In short, the literature suggests that 
financial accounting management and tax management are not independent and neither 
consideration consistently dominates the other in decision-making.”122 In other words, to 
a greater or lesser extent, managers trade off taxes for earnings.  Again, rather than 
reviewing a large sample of such studies, I will focus on just one example involving 
disqualification of incentive stock options (ISOs) and leave the interested reader to peruse 
the review studies cited in the notes.123 The ISO disqualification evidence is consistent 
with what we have seen before – accounting matters, but evidence supporting positive 
accounting theory explanations of accounting relevance is mixed.  
 Compared with nonqualified stock options, ISOs provide tax benefits for 
optionees, but result in tax costs for issuers.124 In some cases, depending on various tax 
rates and the amount of appreciation in the stock underlying the ISO, it makes economic 
sense for companies and employees to agree to arrange dispositions that will disqualify 
 
119 See id. at 138. 
120 See Kenneth J. Klassen, The Impact of Inside Ownership Concentration on the Trade-Off 
Between Financial and Tax Reporting, 72 ACCT. REV. 455 (1997) 
121 See id. at 472. 
122 See Shackelford & Shevlin, supra note 112, at 327. 
123 In addition to Shackelford & Shevlin, supra note 112, useful reviews of the tax/earnings 
tradeoff literature can be found in Fields et al, supra note 22, Maydew et al, supra note 116, and MYRON S. 
SCHOLES ET AL, TAXES AND BUSINESS PLANNING (2nd ed. 1992). 
124 See SCHOLES ET AL, supra note 123, at 191-92. 
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options for ISO treatment.125 At times the tax benefit to a company from disqualification 
is more than sufficient to reimburse an employee for her additional tax cost.  This 
reimbursement, however, must be recognized as an expense, which reduces reported 
income.126 
Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores investigated ISO exercise and disqualification by 
170 companies between 1982 and 1991 and estimated whether disqualification would 
have resulted in a net tax benefit for the companies and their employees.127 The authors 
determined that in over half of the cases in which there was a net tax benefit, firms failed 
to disqualify options.128 The authors concluded that firms trade off tax benefits against 
reported earnings.129 Cross-sectional analysis of firms that did and did not disqualify 
ISOs yielded some evidence supporting positive accounting theory.  The net tax benefit 
tended to be larger when options were disqualified; and non-disqualifying firms tended to 
be more highly leveraged, and thus would have faced higher debt covenant costs had they 
disqualified their ISOs.130 
As a final egregious example of companies sacrificing taxes for earnings, consider 
a recent study of firms that restated financial statements between 1996 and 2002 as a 
result of SEC accusations of accounting fraud.131 This study found that the mean firm 
paid $11.85 million in taxes on the phantom earnings, or about $0.11 for each dollar of 
inflated earnings.132 Hopefully, these results are not typical.  Managers who are willing 
to commit fraud to inflate earnings probably are less concerned about shareholder value 
than honest managers.  Nonetheless, the study emphasizes the obsession of some 
managers with reported earnings.   
 
III. DOES ACCOUNTING MATTER? SYNTHESIS OF THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
There can be little doubt that accounting matters.  There is strong evidence that 
managers are sensitive to reported earnings and sacrifice cash flow, as in Kamin, to boost 
earnings, and that changes in mandatory accounting standards affect corporate behavior.  
However, evidence of systematic variation in discretionary accounting choices and in 
corporate responses to mandatory accounting standard changes consistent with positive 
accounting theory is mixed.  As the studies sampled in the previous Part indicate, the debt 
covenant hypothesis is perhaps the best supported of the contracting cost theories,133 but 
even with respect to the influence of debt, a recent survey article concludes that the 
empirical results are inconclusive.  The data suggest a relationship between debt and 
 
125 See id. at 196-97. 
126 See id. at 197. 
127 See Steve Matsunaga et al, Disqualifying Dispositions of Incentive Stock Options:  Tax Benefits 
Versus Financial Reporting Costs, 30 J. ACCT. RES. 37, 50-52 (1992). 
128 See id. at 63 tbl 6. 
129 See id. at 66. 
130 See id. at 63 tbl 6. 
131 See Merle Erickson et al, How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings That Do Not Exist?:  
Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings, 79 ACCT. REV. 387 (2004). 
132 See id. at 389. 
133 A review of the voluminous positive accounting theory literature leads one to conclude that 
despite the inconclusive empirical evidence most researchers view the debt covenant hypothesis as the most 
significant of the contracting cost theories developed thus far.   
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accounting, the authors say, but “we cannot draw definitive inferences.”134 Given the 
weakness of the stock price reaction studies, it is plausible, perhaps likely, that 
accounting choice, lobbying against earnings-reducing standard changes, and reaction to 
mandatory standard changes reflects self-serving management behavior as much or more 
than concern with contracting costs generally. 
Perhaps we should not be too surprised that the evidence supporting the positive 
accounting theory explanation is not stronger.  There are several reasons to think that the 
impact of contracting costs would be limited.   Consider changes in mandatory 
accounting standards and the effect of these changes on contracting costs.  At most, a 
shift from mandatory standard A to standard B that results in lower reported earnings 
should have a one-time effect on existing debt covenants.  Renegotiation of existing 
covenants may be costly, but the adoption of standard B in place of standard A should 
have little effect on new debt agreements.135 This is also true of executive compensation 
contracts.  New agreements should be as easily tuned to standard B as A. The only 
persistent effect under this theory has to do with political costs.  Changes that reduce 
reported earnings could have a lasting effect on regulation if regulators are slow to adjust 
their perception of what constitutes normal or excess earnings.   
Recall, also, that the impact of accounting change or accounting choice on debt 
covenants is not necessarily equal to the increase in the expected cost of default.136 Other 
options for dealing with the increased risk, such as renegotiating the covenants or making 
operational changes to offset all or part of the increased risk, may be less costly.137 In 
addition, as noted above, the contracting cost story does not result in an unambiguous 
prediction regarding stock prices.138 Reduced reported earnings should increase the risk 
of costly default on debt covenants but also reduce exposure to increased corporate taxes 
or provide other political benefits.  The effect on executive compensation is ambiguous in 
itself.  The conflicting effects decrease the chances of finding significant results.   
 So this brings us back to our original questions.  Having reviewed the theory and 
empirical evidence, what can we say about Kamin? What can we say about managerial 
opposition to expensing stock option compensation?  What can we say about the likely 
effects of increased book-tax conformity or the potential for instrumental revision of 
accounting standards to shape corporate behavior?  This Part addresses the first two 
questions.  The remaining questions require significant elaboration and are examined in 
Parts IV and V. 
 
A.  Kamin v. American Express 
134 Fields et al, supra note 22, at 26. 
135 If standard B results in less efficient contracting than standard A, there will be some persistent 
loss.  If the standards are arbitrary (such as depreciation methods) or equally useful for contracting there 
will be no persistent effect.  Of course, restricting choice among acceptable accounting procedures can be 
costly, but switching between mandatory standards is unlikely to be. 
136 Of course, many companies may be on such secure footing that the increase in expected cost of 
default resulting from an earnings-decreasing change in accounting is truly negligible.  But these cases do 
not pose a problem for positive accounting theory or the empirical studies considered which rely on cross-
sectional analysis of firms exhibiting a broad range of financial health. 
137 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 138 See Espahbodi et al, supra note 47, at 324.  
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As for Kamin, the American Express directors justification for distributing the 
depreciated DLJ shares, as reflected in the board minutes and reported by the judge in the 
case, was that a $26 million “reduction of net income would have a serious effect on the 
market value of the publicly traded American Express stock.”139 This seems highly 
unlikely.  First, as discussed above, even if one is skeptical of the efficiency of U.S. stock 
markets, it is very hard to imagine that in this case the market had not already adjusted 
American Express’s stock price to reflect the unrealized loss on such a large, discrete, 
publicized investment.140 Direct price effects are improbable.   
Second, it is difficult to believe that contracting costs related to debt covenants 
drove the decision to distribute the securities and forego the tax benefit.  In order for this 
to have been a rational decision in accordance with positive accounting theory, one would 
have to conclude that a one-time $26 million earnings hit increased the expected cost of 
technical debt default by $8 million and that renegotiating debt covenants to account for 
this charge to earnings would have cost $8 million or more.  Moreover, the political cost 
story runs counter to the directors’ decision.  According to Watts and Zimmerman, 
companies prefer to report lower earnings to stave off tax increases or other political 
costs.141 That leaves us with employment contract effects.  Reported earnings apparently 
factored into the compensation of some of the inside directors (and presumably other 
employees).  If these agreements are sticky, reducing reported earnings could have costs 
(lower productivity) and benefits (lower compensation paid), but in all likelihood the net 
compensation effect of reduced reported earnings would have been positive for 
shareholders.  In any event, it seems highly unlikely that the combination of contracting 
costs resulting from the one-time charge against earnings could have approached $8 
million. 
It is much more likely that Kamin is a case of managerial preferences for earnings 
far exceeding shareholder preferences and managers acting on those preferences, in other 
words, a classic agency problem.  It would be nice to be able to say (as I have done in my 
corporate law class for several years) that the directors’ decision in Kamin was 
unambiguously against shareholder interests, but we cannot honestly say that, given our 
current understanding of accounting theory.  However, the burden should have been on 
the directors to explain how the indirect effects of a one-time earnings hit could offset the 
tax benefits foregone.  Rather than relying on a general statement about “serious” market 
effects of a reduction in net income, the onus should have been on the directors and their 
experts to explain why an accounting-driven reduction in earnings would have a serious 
effect.  Was the company very highly leveraged?  Would the earnings reduction have 
triggered technical default?  Was renegotiation of debt covenants or other alternatives to 
foregoing the tax benefit considered?  What were the costs of these alternatives?  If 
management is unable to provide a cost/benefit analysis at least plausibly justifying a 
 
139 See Kamin, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811. 
140 Even Lynn Stout, who is skeptical of the informational efficiency of markets, admits that 
“[i]nformation that is easy to understand and that is trumpeted in the business media … may be 
incorporated into market prices almost immediately.”  Stout, supra note 28, at 656. 
141 See WATTS & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 13, at 223; Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, 
Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards, 53 ACCT. REV. 112, 115 (1978). 
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decision to sacrifice tax benefits for earnings, that decision should not be protected from 
judicial scrutiny under the prevailing corporate law standard.142 
B.  Managerial Opposition to Stock Option Expensing 
 
Similarly, managerial opposition to stock option expensing cannot be dismissed 
out of hand as antagonistic to shareholder interests given our current knowledge of 
accounting theory.  We can be fairly certain that moving fully disclosed stock option 
expense from footnote to income statement can have no direct effect on stock prices, but 
the change surely will involve some contracting costs.  If the debt covenant costs 
associated with this earnings-reducing change exceed the political and employment cost 
savings, some reduction in share prices should be expected.  And, unlike the Kamin 
situation, there is no tax or other direct financial benefit associated with the accounting 
change to offset the increased contracting costs.143 So, at one level, managerial 
opposition to the change seems rational. 
 However, there are reasons to suspect that managerial opposition to option 
expensing exceeds the indirect effect of the standard change on share value.  First, 
although the standard change would be permanent, debt and compensation agreements 
are not.  The contracting costs associated with the change can only arise from existing 
agreements.  New debt agreements and employment contracts can be as easily and 
cheaply tied to the new accounting regime as the old one.  Second, as in Kamin, political 
and employment effects associated with the change presumably would be positive and 
offset the other contracting costs to some extent.  Third, we should not forget the 
evidence that managerial opposition to the 1993 option expensing proposal apparently 
reflected concerns with increased management pay exposure rather than contracting 
costs, or the evidence from the tax/earnings trade off literature suggesting that managerial 
 
142 Unfortunately, the legal burden on directors in case like Kamin is minimal.  In most U.S. 
jurisdictions, unless there is clear self-dealing, courts defer to the rational business judgment of the 
directors.  See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-25 (1986).  However, in order to earn the 
protection of the “business judgment rule,” the directors must demonstrate, inter alia, that they were 
reasonably informed with respect to the matter.  See ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01(c).  
The shareholders’ argument in a future case like Kamin should be that directors who rely on unsupported 
assertions that purely accounting-driven earnings reductions impair share value have not earned the 
protection of the business judgment rule because they have not made themselves reasonably informed in 
light of the theory and evidence.  However, given the resistance of courts to second guess managerial 
decisions and additional statutory protections for managers, particularly in Delaware, I am not optimistic 
about the prospects for such a suit.  See, e.g., In re the Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, No. 
Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) (finding that although “many aspects of 
defendants’ conduct … fell significantly short of the best practices of ideal corporate governance,” the 
Disney directors’ decision to hire Michael Ovitz as company president and provide him with an 
employment contract that purportedly paid Ovitz $140 million when his employment was terminated about 
a year later was at most ordinarily negligent and thus the defendant directors were insulated from liability 
in accordance with the business judgment rule); DGCL § 102(b)(7) (permitting Delaware companies to 
include in their charters exculpatory “provision[s] eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director 
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,” with 
exceptions for, inter alia, breaches of duty of loyalty and “acts or omissions not in good faith”). 
143 This is not to say that there is no benefit to shareholders from rationalizing compensation 
accounting.  Assuming that managers are utilizing options excessively because of their favorable 
accounting treatment, a level playing field should result in a more efficient mix of compensation. 
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preferences for high reported earnings often overcome apparently more significant cash 
flow considerations.   
 
IV. BOOK-TAX CONFORMITY 
U.S. public companies maintain separate tax and financial accounts, prepared 
under different rules and producing different results.  The administrative cost of 
maintaining multiple sets of books has long been recognized, but justified as necessary 
given the differing purposes of and audiences for tax and financial reports.144 In recent 
years, however, the focus has been on the growing gap between earnings reported to 
investors (relatively high) and income reported to the taxing authorities (relatively low) 
and suspicion that part of this gap represents inappropriate tax avoidance and/or earnings 
inflation.145 Of course, part of the gap flows from explicit tax incentives, such as 
accelerated tax depreciation, or from recognized financial accounting anomalies, such as 
the failure to record compensatory stock options as an expense.  It is widely believed, 
however, that these deviations represent only part of the gap.146 Reformers argue that tax 
shelters and earnings inflation schemes tend to rely on discontinuities between book and 
tax accounting.  Companies seek out techniques that will allow them to report less 
taxable income without reducing reported earnings and they prefer earnings enhancement 
schemes that do not result in increased taxable income.147 Eliminating these 
discontinuities, it is argued, would tend to discourage these activities.148 In a world of 
full conformity between financial and tax accounting rules, companies could not inflate 
earnings without paying additional taxes and could not cut taxes without cutting earnings 
as well.   
 Of course, no one suggests that even full book-tax conformity would be a 
panacea.  Even faced with a tradeoff, firms may inappropriately shelter income from tax 
or inflate earnings.  In Kamin, the book and tax treatment of the disposition of the shares 
were in conformity.  American Express faced a tradeoff between minimizing taxes and 
maximizing reported earnings, and chose the latter.  Of course, Kamin did not involve 
accounting fraud or tax sheltering, but the suggestion is that without the counterweight 
 
144 See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979) (discussing differing 
goals of and audiences for financial and tax accounting). 
145 See Lillian F. Mills & George A. Plesko, Bridging the Reporting Gap: A Proposal for More 
Informative Reconciling of Book and Tax Income, 56 NAT. TAX J. 865, 867-868 (2003) (providing data on 
the increasing ratio of book income to taxable income between the early 1970s and late 1990s and citing 
other studies providing evidence of an increasing gap in the 1990s); Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 11, at 2 
(citing studies finding increasing divergence between book and tax income and noting concern that the 
difference may be caused by misleading or fraudulent reporting of book income, tax income, or both); 
George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do Large Public Corporations Pay?: Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of 
the S&P 500, 89 VA. L. REV. 1793, 1798 (2003) (confirming conclusions of previous studies finding 
increased gap between book and taxable income in the late 1990s). 
146 See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai, The Divergence Between Book and Tax Income, in 17 TAX POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY (James M. Poterba ed., 2003) (arguing that differences arising from the disparate 
treatment of depreciation, stock options, and foreign source income do not explain the entire book-tax 
difference and suggesting tax sheltering as the likely explanation for the residual difference). 
147 See, e.g., Yin, supra note 10, at 225. 
148 See id.
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provided by conforming book and tax accounting treatments, companies are more likely 
to stretch the rules in seeking to maximize earnings and minimize tax.   
The pros and cons of increased book-tax conformity have been widely debated.149 
However, the behavioral impact of accounting standards has not been fully considered by 
the participants in this debate.  This Part argues that the behavioral effects would be 
largely negative.  These negative effects represent an underappreciated cost of book-tax 
conformity and provide reason to prefer the alternative of increased disclosure and 
reconciliation between financial and tax accounts. 
 
A.  Book-Tax Conformity Proposals 
 
Book-tax conformity could be advanced in many ways.  Full conformity could be 
achieved by assessing corporate taxes on income reported under GAAP, or by requiring 
that financial accounts be prepared consistent with the Internal Revenue Code.  Both 
financial and tax accounting could be based on a compromise set of rules between the 
current tax code and GAAP.  Other options include using one of the foregoing as a 
baseline for both tax and financial reporting but providing for specific deviations for one 
of the two sets of books.  The most common proposals advocate a partial conformity 
approach utilizing GAAP as a baseline but anticipating that Congress would specify 
certain discrete deviations for tax accounting.150 
Partial conformity is not wholly alien to U.S. accountants.  It exists in the U.S. for 
inventory accounting.  Under current tax rules, companies are allowed to value inventory 
under either a “first in, first out” (FIFO) approach, in which case the value of inventory 
tends to approximate current costs, or a “last-in, first-out” (LIFO) approach, in which 
case historic inventory values tend to persist.  However, companies electing to use the 
LIFO approach for tax purposes are required to use the same approach to valuing 
inventories in preparing the accounts presented to investors.151 In a period of rising 
prices, LIFO inventory valuation results in less taxable income than FIFO valuation.152 
149 Scholarly articles proposing or supporting some form of increased book-tax conformity include 
Yin, supra note 10, Celia Whitaker, Bridging the Book-Tax Accounting Gap, 115 YALE L.J. 680 (2005), 
Desai, supra note 10, and Mitchell L. Engler, Corporate Tax Shelters and Narrowing the Book/Tax 
“GAAP,” 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 539.  Calls for increased conformity in the popular press are common 
as well.  See, e.g., Alan Murray, Narrowing Tax Gap Should Be Priority of Next Congress, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 8, 2002, at A4.  Articles criticizing or questioning increased conformity include Johnson, supra note 
11, Terry Shevlin, Corporate Tax Shelters and Book-Tax Differences, 55 TAX L. REV. 427 (2002), Hanlon 
& Shevlin, supra note 11, Michelle Hanlon et al, Evidence on the Possible Information Loss of Conforming 
Book Income and Tax Income (working paper, Jan. 2005).  Other useful articles examining book-tax 
conformity include Wolfgang Schon, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture:  The Odd Couple:  A Common 
Future for Financial and Tax Accounting, 58 TAX L. REV. 111, 115-116 (2005); Desai, supra note 146. 
150 See Yin, supra note 10, at 224; Whitaker, supra note 149, at 721; Engler, supra note 149, at 
559; Desai, supra note 10, at 21. 
151 See IRC § 472(c). 
152 In determining taxable income, businesses that buy and sell inventory first calculate gross 
profit as follows:  Gross profit = receipts – cost of goods sold (COGS).  COGS = value of opening 
inventory + inventory purchased – value of closing inventory.  Compared with FIFO, LIFO results in 
reduced gross profit and taxable income during inflationary periods because LIFO results in a relatively 
lower closing inventory valuation and a relatively greater cost of goods sold.  See IRC §§ 471, 472; 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 750-
54 (5th ed. 2005). 
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But LIFO valuation also results in reduced reported earnings in inflationary times.  This 
is the natural check that book-tax conformity provides and explains why some firms 
“voluntarily” pay taxes that could be eliminated by adopting LIFO and reporting lower 
earnings for both purposes.153 
Inventory accounting is an isolated example of book-tax conformity in the U.S.  
Book-tax conformity is much more common in countries that traditionally have relied 
less on public markets to provide corporate finance, such as Germany, France, and 
Japan.154 In these countries mandated conformity often allows for company choice along 
the lines of the U.S. LIFO/FIFO example.  German companies, for example, may elect to 
accelerate depreciation for tax purposes only if the depreciation deductions are reflected 
equally in the financial accounts.155 
Of course, in one sense the current U.S. system could be thought of as a “partial” 
book-tax conformity system.  The tax code does provide that “[t]axable income shall be 
computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly 
computes his income in keeping his books.”156 But the exceptions swallow the rule, and 
the courts have long acknowledged that taxpayers cannot rely on GAAP where contrary 
to tax rules and regulations.157 
B.  Issues and Concerns with Book-Tax Conformity Proposals 
 
My principal aim in this Part is to call attention to several unrecognized or 
underappreciated problems with book-tax conformity that arise from the effects of 
accounting on managerial and corporate behavior.  However, before addressing those 
issues in the next section, this section summarizes and expands upon a number of other 
concerns with increased conformity. 
 
1.  Information Loss 
 
The primary aim of financial accounting is to provide relevant, reliable, 
consistent, and comparable financial information to the capital markets in order to ensure 
 
153 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 152, at 754.  U.S. oil companies generally use LIFO 
inventory accounting.  For these companies, LIFO provides advantages for both tax and earnings purposes.  
The profits of the oil majors are very sensitive to world oil prices.  When crude oil prices rise, gasoline 
pump prices rise, as do the profits of the oil majors, inevitably leading to price gouging investigations and 
calls for the imposition of windfall profits taxes on the oil companies.  The negative political costs of high 
reported earnings arising from oil price jumps almost certainly outweigh other contracting costs as well as 
the oil executives’ general preferences for high reported earnings.  By holding down both reported earnings 
and taxable income in a period of rising oil prices, LIFO is unambiguously positive for the oil majors.  See 
David Reilly, Big Oil’s Accounting Methods Fuel Criticism, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2006, at C1 (discussing 
effect of LIFO on recent taxable income of Exxon Mobil and other U.S. oil companies). 
154 See Paul J. Rutteman, A Comparative View of Accounting Regulations, in THE SEC AND 
ACCOUNTING: THE FIRST 50 YEARS: 1984 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARTHUR YOUNG PROFESSORS’
ROUNDTABLE 95, 99-105 (Robert H. Mundheim & Noyes E. Leech eds., 1984) 
155 See id. at 100; Schon, supra note 149, at 115-116. 
156 IRC § 446(a). 
157 See Thor Power Tool Co., 439 U.S. 522 (1979). 
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efficient allocation of resources,158 and a principal concern of accounting researchers is 
that book-tax conformity would lead to a loss of value-relevant information.159 
Generally, financial accounting standards best fulfill their information-providing role 
when they produce results that mirror economic accounting results, e.g., when financial 
depreciation mirrors economic depreciation.  Thus, it has been argued that requiring 
financial statements to be prepared on the basis of tax accounting rules, or even 
conforming somewhere in between current financial and tax accounting rules, would 
result in the loss of value-relevant information.160 Studies demonstrate that financial 
statements are indeed less relevant in countries in which tax rules influence financial 
accounting rules.161 
However, research shows that tax and financial accounts contribute individually 
to the efficiency of the market.162 As a result, even if GAAP were accepted as the basis 
for both books, there would be a loss of information.163 To be sure, the loss would be 
greater if financial accounts were prepared on the basis of the tax rules, but the 
elimination of either set of books would be costly from an information perspective.164 
2.  Control of Tax Policy 
 
Some commentators doubt that Congress would be willing to cede control over 
tax rules to the FASB.165 Full conformity based on GAAP would result in a change in tax 
law every time the FASB issued a new standard.  Even partial conformity with a GAAP 
baseline would cede substantial control of tax policy to the FASB.  Unless Congress had 
already enacted a specific exception for a particular item or transaction, a change in 
GAAP would result in a change in tax unless and until Congress acted to override the 
change for tax purposes.  Other arrangements for sharing responsibility are feasible, but a 
GAAP baseline for tax assessment seriously conflicts with congressional control over tax 
policy.166 
Of course, some commentators, following the lead of Stanley Surrey, would 
applaud a change that would make it more difficult for Congress to implement social or 
 
158 See Financial Accounting Standards Board, Facts about FASB, at www.FASB.org (providing 
FASB mission statement). 
159 See Hanlon et al, supra note 149, at 2; Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 11, at 5. 
160 See Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 11, at 5.  While book-tax conformity could theoretically 
occur anywhere along the continuum between financial accounting standards and tax accounting rules, 
Hanlon and Shevlin assume that Congress would not be willing to cede control of tax rules to a private 
standard setting body and that conformity would likely occur at or near tax accounting.  See id. at 18.  But 
see Yin, supra note 10 (arguing for book-tax conformity with a financial accounting baseline and limited 
specific deviations for tax purposes); Whitaker, supra note 149 (same). 
161 See Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 11, at 23 (citing Ashiq Ali & Lee-Seok Hwang, Country-
Specific Factors Related to Financial Reporting and the Value Relevance of Accounting Data, 38 J. ACCT.
RES. 1 (2000)). 
162 See Hanlon et al, supra note 149, at 37. 
163 See id.
164 See id. (estimating that if the accounts were conformed based on tax rules, the reduction in the 
explanatory power of the income measure would be on the order of 50%, but arguing that even conformity 
at GAAP would result in the loss of incremental information provided by the taxable income measure). 
165 See Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 11, at 4, Shevlin, supra note 149, at 435. 
166 See Shevlin, supra note 149, at 434 (discussing options for shared responsibility between 
Congress and the FASB).  
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economic policy via the tax code.167 But the idea of Congress abandoning tax incentives 
is probably unrealistic.  One could argue that if Congress’ principal concern was the 
revenue associated with the corporate tax, Congress could easily cede responsibility for 
tax accounting to the FASB and simply adjust the tax rates as necessary.  However, if one 
believes that Congress is as or more concerned with economic intervention via the tax 
code, then the likelihood is that a GAAP baseline tax with specific exceptions would 
rapidly degenerate into something approaching the current tax code as Congress enacted 
various tax favors, incentives and penalties.  It seems much more likely that tax rules 
would serve as the basis for any book-tax conformity proposal acceptable to Congress.  
 
3.  Instability Generally 
 
Essentially for the reasons given above, Hanlon and Shevlin have argued that 
partial conformity is inherently unstable, particularly partial conformity based on a 
GAAP baseline.168 Once exceptions to a GAAP-based tax are allowed, they argue, 
special interest lobbying would lead to greater and greater discontinuities.  Full 
conformity may be unrealistic, but if achieved it could possibly be maintained.  It is 
difficult to imagine a GAAP-based tax with a handful of specific tax exceptions not 
becoming two essentially separate systems. 
 
4.  Politicization of the Financial Accounting Standard Setting Process 
 
Compared with the tax writing process, financial accounting standard setting 
seems blissfully non-political.  Of course, business people lobby the FASB,169 and 
Congress and the SEC exert their influence from time to time,170 but by maintaining its 
emphasis on neutral rules of accounting, the FASB has deflected a great deal of potential 
interference.  Increased book-tax conformity would almost inevitably lead to the 
politicization of financial accounting.171 
Consider the scenario in which current tax rules or some hybrid between current 
tax and accounting rules enacted by Congress form the basis for both sets of books.  
Financial accounting would become just as much a political football as taxes are today, 
and lobbying would increase for the following reasons:  First, public companies would 
have more at stake in the rules selected by Congress, since these rules would control for 
both tax and accounting purposes.  Second, Congress’s freedom to insert special interest 
accounting favors (or penalties) would increase given the shift from a single goal of 
promulgating neutral accounting standards to a multi-purpose, multi-policy tax and 
accounting standard setting process.  Increasing the stakes in a venue that is more 
 
167 See infra Part V.C.6 (discussing inefficiencies highlighted by Surrey in the provision of 
economic incentives through the tax code). 
168 See Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 11, at 18. 
169 See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & Ehsan H. Feroz, Does the FASB Listen to Corporations?, 19 J. 
BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 715 (1992) (finding that the FASB is influenced by corporate comment letters and that 
larger corporations have more influence than smaller ones). 
170 See infra Part V.C.3. 
171 See Shevlin, supra note 149, at 434-35 (noting inevitability of congressional involvement in 
standard setting with increased book-tax conformity). 
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susceptible to lobbying would increase the expected payoffs from lobbying, and thus 
should result in more lobbying.172 
On the other hand, suppose that a GAAP-based tax approach were adopted with 
specific tax deviations enacted by Congress.  The FASB’s influence over taxes would be 
significant in any mixed responsibility scenario.  Despite FASB’s neutrality stance, 
businesses could be expected to increase their lobbying of that organization, given the 
increased stakes involved in the FASB’s pronouncements, and, since the odds of a 
congressional tax override would be uncertain, pressure on and by individual members of 
Congress to intervene in the FASB’s deliberations would be intense.  It may not be 
realistic to expect a private group of accountants to be able to navigate these political 
waters and successfully set both accounting rules and default tax rules.  Even if it is 
feasible, this would not be an appropriate role for a private organization like the FASB.  
This realization provides further reason to think that conformity, if it is to occur, is more 
likely to happen at the tax end of the spectrum and fall firmly within congressional 
control.  The primary point, however, is that any book-tax conformity proposal entails the 
politicization of financial accounting standard setting. 
 
C.  Book-Tax Conformity and Corporate Behavior 
 
The costs of book-tax conformity described above are serious, but of course the 
benefits could be greater.  This section, however, presents several additional concerns 
arising out of the effects of accounting results on managerial and corporate behavior that 
further undermine the case for book-tax conformity.  In brief, the concerns are that 
increased book-tax conformity (1) is less likely to forestall artificial earnings inflation 
than most commentators assume, and indeed may result in excessive sacrifice of tax 
benefits for earnings; (2) will result in reduced consistency in financial reporting than 
exists today, making cross company comparisons more difficult; and (3) will undermine 
economic incentives whether conformity occurs at the tax end of the spectrum, the book 
end, or somewhere in between.  
 
1.  Accounting and Operational Flexibility and the Book-Tax Tradeoff 
 
Because of the forced tradeoff between high reported earnings and happy 
investors on the one hand, and low taxable earnings and low corporate taxes on the other, 
book-tax conformity has been suggested as a response both to tax sheltering and artificial 
earnings inflation, depending on the dominant concern at the time.  Fair enough, but is 
book-tax conformity more likely to reduce sheltering or inflated earnings?  Where would 
 
172 According to the economic theory of regulation, the benefits and burdens that are granted or 
imposed by the state on firms are subject to the laws of supply and demand, and lobbying expenditures are 
determined like any other business expenditure.  Managers compare the expected payoffs from lobbying 
against other profit-seeking opportunities in optimizing the allocation of corporate resources.  Under this 
model, the stakes and susceptibility of the regulator to being influenced are important determinants of 
lobbying effort and expenditure.  See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. 
ECON. & MGMT. SCI., 3 (1971) (the seminal article); see also, FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING:
POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 1-19 (1997) (providing overview of the 
economic theory of regulation and focusing on the burden side of the equation, i.e., on the power of 
government to extort wealth from industry under the threat of adverse regulation).   
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firms come out on the continuum between tax minimization and earnings maximization?  
As long as there is some managerial discretion over accounting choice and operational 
decisions, it would be impossible for a regulator to tie corporations to a point along that 
continuum.   
Most commentators who have addressed this issue have suggested that tax 
minimization would dominate.173 The analysis developed herein suggests otherwise.  It 
seems likely that book-tax conformity would result in managers sacrificing tax benefits 
for earnings to a greater extent than shareholders would prefer.  Thus, increased book-tax 
conformity may be a partial answer to tax sheltering, but is unlikely to hinder artificial 
earnings inflation and indeed may result in some reduction in share values as managers 
act to maximize their own utility rather than that of shareholders. 
 
a.  Flexibility in Managing Taxes and Earnings 
 
Whether conformity is achieved based on GAAP, the tax code, or something in 
between, managers would retain flexibility to manage taxes and earnings.  Current GAAP 
is much more flexible than the tax code, and a certain degree of financial accounting 
flexibility is generally viewed as a positive feature.  As discussed above, there are many 
users of financial data, and the flexibility in GAAP allows firms to choose the accounting 
treatments that most efficiently portray data and minimize contracting costs.174 But given 
the flexibility of GAAP, assessing corporate tax on reported income would provide 
companies with broad discretion to minimize tax or maximize reported earnings with 
respect to such key inputs as recognition of revenues and costs, inventory valuation, and 
depreciation.175 
A book-tax conformity approach utilizing a GAAP baseline with specific tax 
departures could provide either more or less flexibility than a straight GAAP-based tax, 
depending on whether the departures were mandated or made optional.  In all likelihood, 
the result would be some of both.  One can imagine Congress providing optional tax 
incentives for items such as depreciation and mandatory tax penalties for items such as 
non-performance based executive compensation.176 
The current tax code provides less flexibility than GAAP, but some discretion 
does exist.  For example, accelerated tax depreciation is not mandatory; firms can elect to 
apply straight-line tax depreciation.177 Firms may elect to deduct certain research and 
experimental expenditures instead of capitalizing them, but they are not forced to.178 
Of course, even if accounting rules were fixed, accounting discretion would 
remain to the extent of operational discretion.  For example, many companies have 
 
173 See infra notes 180-183 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 175 See JAMIE PRATT, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING IN AN ECONOMIC CONTEXT 84-89, 279-286, 368-
373 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining accounting rules and choices relating to revenue and expense recognition, 
inventory valuation, and depreciation, respectively).  
176 These approaches would be consistent with the current tax code.  As discussed below, 
accelerated tax depreciation is optional under IRC § 168(b).  On the other hand, the tax code contains 
mandatory tax penalties related to excessive provision of non-performance based executive compensation 
(IRC § 162(m)) and excess golden parachute payments (IRC § 280G).  
177 IRC § 168(b)(3)(D). 
178 IRC § 174. 
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significant flexibility in managing accruals at year end.179 Under any of these 
approaches, operational flexibility would leave firms with choices between minimizing 
taxes and maximizing reported earnings. 
 
b.  The Book/Tax Tradeoff 
 
How would firms exercise accounting and operational discretion in a book-tax 
conformity regime?  Firm believers in the efficient capital markets hypothesis suggest 
that the primary result would be reduced reported income.  Calvin Johnson has argued 
that companies would find other ways to communicate information to investors and 
would manage their books solely with an eye to minimizing taxes.180 Michelle Hanlon 
and Terry Shevlin have suggested that book-tax conformity could lead to a race to the 
bottom on effective tax rates.181 Peter Joos and Mark Lang have argued that book-tax 
conformity in Germany and France “has provided incentives to reduce taxes by reporting 
lower profits.”182 
Other commentators are less convinced, pointing out the moderating effect of 
management’s motivation to report high earnings.183 The lessons of this Article go 
further:  Increased book-tax conformity would likely lead to increased instances of 
managers sacrificing legitimate tax benefits in order to boost reported earnings.   
At the very least, the tax/earnings tradeoff literature provides strong evidence that 
increased book-tax conformity that leaves discretion with managers to choose between 
high earnings/high tax and low earnings/low tax treatments would not result in tax 
minimization.  And positive accounting theory indicates that, to some extent, sacrificing 
taxes could be in the shareholders’ interest.  A tax minimization position would result in 
lower reported earnings that would increase the expected cost of debt covenant violation.  
At least for some firms, the potential costs of financial distress would outweigh the tax 
savings associated with reporting the lowest possible levels of tax and financial income. 
 However, given the direct and indirect effect of reported earnings on their 
compensation and other factors, managerial decision makers are likely to sacrifice taxes 
for earnings to a greater extent than necessary to maximize share value.  Book-tax 
conformity is likely to reduce tax sheltering, but there is nothing to force managers to 
balance taxes against earnings in the shareholders’ interests.  The tax/earnings balance 
struck by management is likely to result in share value reductions and represents an 
underappreciated cost of increased book-tax conformity.184 
179 See, e.g., Paul K. Chaney & Craig M. Lewis, Earnings Management and Firm Valuation Under 
Asymmetric Information, 1 J. CORP. FIN. 319, 319-320 (citing studies and relating anecdotal evidence of 
accrual management). 
180 See Johnson, supra note 11, at 427.   
181 See Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 11, at 28. 
182 See Peter Joos & Mark Lang, The Effects of Accounting Diversity:  Evidence from the 
European Union, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 141, 145 (1994). 
183 See Schon, supra note 149, at 143. 
184 The cost to shareholders of share value-reducing tradeoffs of tax benefits for earnings is 
obvious.  The social cost may be less obvious.  After all, as Vic Fleischer has suggested to me, this isn’t a 
case of managers consuming excessive perks; they are paying excessive taxes to the government.  But there 
is a social cost.  Share value-reducing actions by managers result in reduced incentives to invest in equity 
securities and ultimately in reduced capital formation.  Cf. CLARK, supra note 142, at 274 (making a similar 
argument that insider trading acts as a tax on investors which may chill capital formation). 
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2.  Discretion and Cross Company Consistency in Financial Reporting 
 
While enhanced book-tax conformity would increase consistency between the 
books of a given firm, conformity could result in a decrease in the consistency and 
comparability of accounting results between companies in the same industry, assuming 
some flexibility in accounting treatment in a book-tax conformity regime.  Assuming that 
the markets see through accounting presentation, decreased inter-company consistency is 
not necessarily fatal to book-tax conformity proposals, but it does represent an added 
cost.  To some extent, analysts would have to work harder to produce comparable 
figures.185 
Consider depreciation.  Although businesses are permitted to employ one of a 
number of approved financial depreciation methods for various depreciable assets, the 
most common technique is straight-line depreciation, which simply prorates the cost of 
the asset, less estimated salvage value, over the estimated useful life of the asset.186 
Straight-line financial depreciation is widely admired for its simplicity, but it is unlikely 
that this trait explains its dominance.  After all, the same firms that utilize straight-line 
depreciation for financial reporting purposes utilize accelerated depreciation for tax 
purposes.  Rather, straight-line depreciation is used for book purposes because, compared 
to the other permitted methods, it results in reduced depreciation expense and greater 
reported income in early years and increased expense and reduced reported income in 
later years.187 In other words, utilizing straight-line financial depreciation allows firms to 
maximize the present value of earnings reported to investors, while adopting accelerated 
depreciation methods for tax purposes allows firms to minimize the present value of 
taxes.   
Imagine that corporate taxes were to be assessed on the basis of GAAP income.  
Firms would face a tradeoff between tax minimization and earnings maximization.  
Managers focused on tax minimization would adopt highly accelerated depreciation 
methods; those focused on earnings would select straight-line depreciation; some might 
compromise by selecting a modestly accelerated depreciation method.  What factors 
would drive the choice?  Positive accounting theory suggests that contracting costs would 
play a role, in which case firm size, degree of leverage, and the extent of earnings-based 
compensation arrangements would all matter.  The previous section argued that 
management earnings preferences would be a key factor, and the strength of those 
preferences and the extent to which they would be satisfied would depend on executive 
 
185 Although this section focuses on cross company consistency of financial reporting, cross 
company consistency of tax reporting is an important issue as well.  Achieving conformity by assessing 
taxes on the basis of GAAP would result in increased company discretion and variability in taxable income 
and taxes, which could have an adverse effect on the perceived fairness of the tax system and taxpayer 
compliance generally.  See Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter Debate:  
Assessing the Proposed Section 475 Mark-to-Market Safe Harbor, 24 VA. TAX REV. 301, 370-80 (2004).  
186 See DAVID R. HERWITZ, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 471 (1980); K. FRED 
SKOUSEN ET AL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 354 (6th ed. 1996) (reporting a survey of 600 companies’ annual 
reports finding that 558 employed straight-line depreciation, 50 employed the units-of-production method, 
and 106 employed accelerated methods.  Obviously, a single company can employ different depreciation 
methods for different assets.) 
187 See SKOUSEN ET AL, supra note 186, at 354. 
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compensation design and other factors, including the quality of corporate governance.  
Given this multiplicity of factors, which may or may not be correlated among firms in a 
particular industry, accounting choices could vary widely even among firms in a single 
industry.  Surely, they would vary more widely than they do today.   
I do not wish to overemphasize this point, and I do not suggest that the cost 
resulting from greater inter-firm variation in accounting choices would be significant.  A 
nuanced view of the ECMH recognizes that information gathering and assimilation is 
costly.  Decreased inter-firm consistency in accounting choice would directionally 
increase analytical costs, but in all likelihood the impact on market efficiency would be 
minimal. 
 
3.  Book-Tax Conformity and Economic Incentives  
 
We have already considered the effect of book-tax conformity on firm choices 
among acceptable accounting treatments and operational decisions with accounting 
implications, such as year-end accruals.  This section considers a related but much more 
pervasive and important issue:  How would book-tax conformity affect the explicit 
economic incentives Congress provides in the tax code and the implicit economic 
incentives embedded in GAAP?  I argue that increased book-tax conformity would 
undermine economic incentives whether conformity is based on GAAP, on the tax code, 
on something in between, or left to company discretion. 
 
a.  Tax Incentives 
 
As every student of basic federal income tax knows, the tax code is riddled with 
provisions that have little or nothing to do with “defining” income, i.e., determining the 
right level of income subject to tax in a platonic sense, and everything to do with 
providing incentives or subsidies to taxpayers.  A familiar example is IRC § 106 which 
generally excludes from the gross income of employees the value of employer provided 
health care and health insurance.  Other in-kind benefits are included in an employee’s 
income, so this exclusion represents a clear subsidy for the creation of employer funded 
health care plans. 
 Many of these tax incentives are directed at corporate behavior and at spurring 
business investment, including accelerated tax depreciation,188 “bonus” depreciation,189 
investment tax credits,190 and special “expensing” provisions permitting immediate 
deduction of expenditures that otherwise must be capitalized and recovered through 
depreciation.191 The effect of each of these tax incentives is to increase the present value 
of deductions (and/or tax credits) associated with the expenditure and thus reduce the 
present value of taxes.  By reducing the tax burden associated with qualified capital 
 
188 Taxpayers are allowed to take deductions for depreciation earlier and in greater amounts than 
“economic” depreciation would provide.  Under IRC § 168, the salvage values of assets are ignored, 
increasing the depreciable amount; the periods over which deductions are taken are shortened, often by as 
much as one-half of the assets’ useful lives; and the depreciation methods generally are accelerated, with 
most assets being subject to 200% or 150% declining balance depreciation.  See IRC § 168(b) & (e). 
189 IRC § 168(k).  See infra note 200 and accompanying text.  
190 See infra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.  
191 See infra notes 195-199 and accompanying text. 
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expenditures, Congress expects businesses will devote more of their resources to or 
accelerate capital investment. 
 Full book-tax conformity utilizing a GAAP as a baseline would eliminate many of 
these tax incentives.192 Unless the tax incentives were replaced with direct subsidies or 
other non-tax incentives, we should expect some shift away from capital investment.  
Moreover, while some of the investment incentives are generic (accelerated depreciation 
applies to almost all depreciable assets and has been relatively stable over time), others 
are highly focused.  For example, investment tax credits currently are available for 
alternative energy development193 and historic structure rehabilitation.194 Taxpayers may 
elect to deduct or capitalize periodical circulation expenses,195 certain research and 
experimental expenditures,196 soil and water conservation costs,197 environmental 
remediation costs,198 and certain other expenditures.199 In a bid to spur economic 
recovery in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress implemented a limited term, 
“bonus” depreciation provision allowing businesses to deduct immediately 30% (later 
increased to 50%) of otherwise depreciable capital expenditures.200 Although one can 
argue that these incentives could be more efficiently delivered by other means, the loss of 
these incentives is an argument against taxing corporate income on the basis of GAAP.  
More to the point, Congress is unlikely to relinquish the opportunity to intervene, 
whether its focused incentives reflect special interest lobbying or rational responses to 
market failures. 
 
b.  Accounting Incentives 
 
One might be tempted to think that the economic incentive problem could be 
solved by conforming book and tax at the tax end of the spectrum, rather than the GAAP 
end, in other words, by reporting taxable income to both investors and the IRS.  But that 
is not the case.  As we have seen, accounting rules affect managerial behavior much as 
tax rules do, and adopting the Internal Revenue Code for financial accounting would 
eliminate many implicit accounting incentives. 
 Reconsider depreciation.  As noted above, today most firms utilize straight-line 
financial depreciation for most items because the method is simple, but more importantly, 
because straight-line depreciation tends to maximize the present value of reported 
earnings.201 Because managers are motivated to report high earnings, the option to 
 
192 However, some tax incentives would remain.  For example, although GAAP limits depreciation 
to cost minus salvage value, accelerated depreciation methods, such as the 200% declining balance method, 
are allowable. 
193 See IRC § 48. 
194 See IRC § 47. 
195 See IRC § 173. 
196 See IRC § 174. 
197 See IRC § 175. 
198 See IRC § 198. 
199 See e.g., IRC § 179A (qualified clean fuels vehicle credit). 
200 The 30% bonus depreciation allowance applied to certain property acquired after September 
10, 2001 and before May 6, 2003.  The allowance was later increased to 50% for property acquired after 
May 5, 2003, and placed in service before January 1, 2005.  See IRC § 168(k). 
201 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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employ earnings enhancing straight-line depreciation (relative to accelerated 
depreciation) can be viewed as a financial accounting incentive for capital investment.   
 If firms were required to utilize the tax depreciation rules in preparing their 
financial reports, their appetite for capital investment would be lessened.  Under the 
accelerated depreciation methods generally used for tax, the present value of reported 
expenses associated with capital investment would increase substantially, leading to 
deferral of capital investment or substitution away from capital investment and in favor 
of leasing or other non-capital operational alternatives at the margin.  To be sure, the tax 
code permits firms to utilize straight-line depreciation,202 but even this election would not 
fully eliminate the earnings hit from the change in rules, given non-elective tax rules 
related to salvage value and depreciation periods that also accelerate deductions.203 Of 
course, any depreciation baseline is essentially arbitrary.  There is no one correct 
depreciation technique that reproduces economic depreciation for all assets.  But whether 
straight-line financial depreciation represents a subsidy or normality is unimportant, the 
point is that this and other gaps between GAAP and the tax code can be thought of as tax 
incentives, accounting incentives, or a mix of the two. 
 In many cases “GAAP incentives” are simply the flip-side of tax incentives.  In 
other words, the financial accounting treatment may approximate economic reality, while 
the tax rules reflect subsidies.  To some extent this is the case for depreciation.  Another 
example is the disparate treatment of municipal bond interest.  The interest on such bonds 
is not included in taxable income and generally is viewed as a subsidy to state and local 
governments that are able to reduce their borrowing costs through the issuance of these 
bonds.204 But the interest received is included in reported earnings.205 Adopting a tax 
baseline for both tax and book purposes would preserve the tax incentive but introduce a 
financial accounting disincentive for corporations to purchase municipal bonds. 
In other cases, GAAP permits income-increasing or income-accelerating 
accounting procedures relative to clearly more neutral treatments incorporated in the tax 
code.  Examples include the failure to require expensing of compensatory stock options 
until this year and the recent elimination of the requirement to amortize purchased 
goodwill.206 Because these deviations resulted from industry lobbying, it is not surprising 
that they are income enhancing.  What is surprising is that they have not been recognized 
as incentives, although they should be.  Conforming GAAP with the arguably more 
neutral tax treatment of these items would tend to discourage the use of compensatory 
options and discourage merger activity. 
The bottom line is that whether an accounting rule can be said to be neutral and 
economically correct and the corresponding tax rule to be the deviation and the incentive, 
or vice versa, it is important to mind the gap.  Eliminating the gap in either direction will 
reduce the tax incentive, create an accounting disincentive, or do some of both.  
 
202 See IRC § 168(b)(3)(D). 
203 See IRC § 168(b)(4), (e). 
204 See IRC § 103. 
205 See ROBERT LIBBY ET AL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 514 (3rd ed. 2001). 
206 Non-qualified stock options result in a tax deduction equal to the amount of income recognized 
by the optionee in the year of option exercise.  See IRC § 83(h).  Under IRC § 197 purchased goodwill is 
amortized ratably over a fifteen period.  SFAS No. 142 provides that purchased goodwill need only be 
recognized for financial accounting purposes to the extent that it is impaired. 
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c.  Economic Consequences of Eliminating Accounting Incentives 
 
The theory and evidence suggest that the elimination of implicit accounting 
incentives in GAAP relative to the tax code would have economic effects comparable to 
the elimination of tax incentives as a result of adopting a GAAP-based tax.  First, 
consider the effect of an earnings-decreasing change in accounting standards under the 
contracting cost theory, perhaps a shift from straight-line to accelerated depreciation.  
The debt covenant theory predicts that such a change would result in an indirect decrease 
in share prices.  The markets would see through the accounting change in pricing 
company securities, but the reduction in reported earnings would make it more likely that 
firms would violate sticky debt covenants, increasing the expected cost of covenant 
violation.  Reduced political costs might offset the debt covenant effect, as lowered 
reported earnings deflect the attention of congressional tax writers.  In addition, sticky 
employment contracts that are based in part on reported earnings would tend to result in 
reduced compensation payments that might or might not be accompanied by reduced 
productivity.  If debt covenant effects dominate, as suggested by the positive accounting 
theory literature, one would expect a net reduction in share prices resulting from an 
earnings-decreasing change in accounting standards.  Thus, a shareholder-loyal manager 
would tend to make operational choices, including reduced capital investment, reflecting 
the earnings-decreasing change in accounting. 
Once again, however, managerial appetite for earnings may exceed that of 
shareholders.  Even if the negative effect of an earnings-decreasing standard change on 
stock prices is modest, managers may strongly resist the change and adjust operations to 
avoid it for self-serving reasons.  As noted above, managers may honestly, but incorrectly 
believe that reduced reported earnings directly reduce share prices, they may be 
socialized into placing inordinate emphasis on high reported earnings, or they may 
simply react to the negative effect of reduced reported earnings on their own 
compensation.   
We have already reviewed a great deal of empirical evidence suggesting that 
managers respond to financial accounting effects.  I do not wish to rehash that evidence 
here, but we should consider what this evidence tells us about the potential impact of an 
earnings-decreasing change in accounting standards, such as a shift to the more 
accelerated depreciation rules of the tax code.  There are several reasons to be cautious of 
reading too much into the empirical record.  First, cases like Kamin concerning very 
large, one-time earnings hits, do not provide convincing evidence that managers take 
reported earnings into account in making day to day operational or investment decisions.  
Second, while the evidence indicating that stock option use has been largely accounting 
driven supports instrumental accounting, managers, as we have discussed, have a 
particular reason for wanting to keep their own compensation as obscure as possible, 
making it hard to generalize from that example.  Perhaps the most persuasive evidence 
supporting significant behavioral responses to accounting standards lies in corporate 
reaction to earlier standard changes such as SFAS 106, which replaced pay-as-you-go 
accounting for post-retirement health care benefits with accrual accounting, and SFAS 
13, which moved capital lease disclosures out of the footnotes and onto balance sheets.  
In both cases companies responded by making operational changes as if the reduced 
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reported earnings mattered.  In one case, managers slashed benefits; in the other they 
shifted away from capital leases towards more accounting-friendly operating leases.207 
Overall, the theory and evidence suggests that accounting matters and that 
managers would respond to earnings-decreasing shifts in GAAP in a predictable fashion.  
However, one might assume that the economic effect would be transitory if contracting 
costs are an important part of the story.  Once old debt agreements expire and new 
contracts are written taking into account tax code-based accounting standards, would the 
accounting disincentives disappear?  In fact, they would not.  Imagine that initially all 
companies employ straight-line financial depreciation.  Next, Congress requires that 
financial depreciation be calculated under the more accelerated tax depreciation rules.  
The change has the effect of increasing the present value of expenses and decreasing the 
present value of earnings associated with capital investment.  Under the debt covenant 
hypothesis, the share value of capital intensive companies would fall and firms would 
reduce or defer capital investment at the margin.  Ultimately, corporate borrowers and 
lenders would respond to the new accounting environment by negotiating covenants 
associated with new bond offerings in which the level of earnings that triggers default is 
lowered.  So equilibrium between corporate borrowers and lenders is restored.  But that 
does not mean that the accounting bias against capital investment is eliminated.  It 
persists.  If a company were to ramp back up its capital expenditures, it would suffer a 
decrease in the present value of reported earnings, increasing the expected cost of default. 
 
4.  Economic Consequences and Flexible Book-Tax Conformity 
 
The foregoing analysis suggests that reduction of the gap between tax and 
financial accounting would have adverse economic consequences however the gap is 
reduced.   But it also suggests that if full conformity is the objective, how it is achieved 
matters.  Allowing firms to choose the basis for conformity could minimize the adverse 
economic consequences.  On the other hand, given flexibility, managers would be 
expected to make the earnings/tax tradeoff that maximizes their own utility, rather than 
shareholder value.  On balance, it is unclear whether providing flexibility in book-tax 
conformity would benefit shareholders or not. 
Individual company flexibility in achieving book-tax conformity is common.  As 
we have seen, the one example of book-tax conformity currently in place in the U.S. 
requires consistency between LIFO and FIFO accounting for book and tax reporting, but 
leaves the choice up to individual companies.208 Similarly, German rules allow firms to 
choose between straight-line and accelerated depreciation, as long as they are 
consistent.209 Moreover, these choices need not be binary.  One can imagine permitting 
firms to select from a range of depreciation methods as long as internal consistency is 
maintained.   
 Shareholder-loyal managers could use such flexibility to minimize the adverse 
economic consequences of book-tax conformity.  Firms that were relatively insensitive to 
reported earnings (because non-public or flush with cash) would select the conforming 
 
207 The tax-earnings trade off literature discussed supra Part II.D reinforces the power of 
accounting results to shape corporate behavior.   
208 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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treatment that minimized taxes, such as accelerated depreciation.  Firms that were 
relatively insensitive to taxes (because of large net operating losses) would select the 
conforming treatment that maximized earnings.  Firms in between these extremes would 
trade off earnings maximization against tax minimization. 
 Well governed firms would make these trade offs with an eye towards 
maximizing share value.  The concern, of course, is that managers of many firms would 
sacrifice taxes for earnings to a greater extent than necessary to optimize share value.   Of 
course, even if conforming treatments are specified by Congress, many managers would 
utilize operational flexibility in the same way.  However, adding flexibility in accounting 
treatments is likely to exacerbate the agency problem. 
 
D.  Further Book-Tax Conformity Alternatives and Alternatives to Conformity 
 
Full book-tax conformity is problematic from an economic consequences 
perspective.  Better from this standpoint are partial book-tax conformity proposals, such 
as the idea of utilizing a GAAP baseline with specific tax deviations adopted by 
Congress.  For example, Mitchell Engler has proposed a more nuanced approach to book-
tax conformity that would maintain intended tax incentives, such as accelerated 
depreciation, while closing pernicious gaps.210 Maintaining the disparate treatment of 
depreciation for tax and book purposes would maintain current tax and accounting 
incentives.  Further, compared to the German flexible depreciation model, this proposal 
would limit the extent to which managers would inappropriately sacrifice taxes for 
reported earnings.  The problem, of course, is identifying the pernicious gaps.  Almost all 
deviations between GAAP and the tax code result in tax and/or accounting incentives.  
And, of course, as Hanlon and Shevlin have argued, the stability of partial book-tax 
conformity is open to question. 
 Although at first blush increased book-tax conformity seems an attractive 
approach to combating tax sheltering and artificial earnings inflation, commentators have 
pointed out numerous problems with proposals for enhanced conformity.  The adverse 
economic consequences of increasing book-tax conformity, whatever the method, add to 
the arguments against adopting this tool and in favor of other means of attacking these 
problems, principally enhanced disclosure and reconciliation of book-tax differences.211 
Detailed consideration of the merits of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but it is worth noting that unlike increased book-tax conformity, enhanced 
disclosure and reconciliation would add to the information available to the market and 
would have little or no economic consequence.  Like footnotes to accounting statements, 
the tax reconciliation reports would have no affect on reported earnings or taxes paid.  Of 
course, mandating more extensive reconciliations would increase rather than decrease 
compliance costs, but given the adverse economic consequences of book-tax conformity 
and other drawbacks, disclosure and reconciliation may be the superior approach. 
 
V. INSTRUMENTAL ACCOUNTING 
210 See Engler, supra note 149. 
211 See, e.g., Mills & Plesko, supra note 145 (proposing revisions to the tax schedules used to 
reconcile tax and book income). 
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 This final Part considers a series of related policy questions that are prompted by 
recognition of the economic consequences of accounting standards, as outlined in the 
previous Parts:  If earnings-decreasing shifts in GAAP made to increase book-tax 
conformity would have adverse economic consequences, would earnings-increasing 
adjustments to GAAP have positive economic consequences?  Book-tax conformity 
aside, should we consider the economic consequences of accounting in the standard 
setting process?  More affirmatively, should accounting standards be used instrumentally 
as a means of encouraging investment or otherwise shaping corporate behavior, an 
alternative to tax incentives, direct subsidies and legal mandates?  
Of course, there would be drawbacks to adopting accounting standards that 
deviate from economic accounting, but in a second best world, they might serve as a 
valuable addition to the public policy toolbox.  As we will see, replacing tax incentives or 
direct subsidies with accounting incentives could reduce the burden on the public fisc.  
However, the costs would be significant as well.  Embracing instrumental accounting 
would open up the standard setting process to lobbying and potential capture by the 
interest group with the most at stake – corporate management.  In addition, purposeful 
deviation from economic accounting would diminish the usefulness of accounting reports 
to investors and other users.  This final Part briefly considers the potential benefits and 
costs of instrumental accounting.  Although an omniscient and benevolent power could 
increase social welfare though the use of explicit accounting incentives, Congress is not 
such a power, and this Part tentatively concludes that social welfare is probably 
maximized by minimizing Congress’ role in accounting and leaving the FASB to achieve 
as well as it can “neutral” standards of accounting.  
 
A.  How Would Instrumental Accounting Work? 
 
Instrumental accounting would entail designing substantive financial accounting 
standards with a view towards shaping managerial, and thus corporate, behavior.  
Analogous to tax incentives and penalties, accounting incentives and penalties would 
represent purposeful deviations from ideal or “economic” accounting standards, i.e., 
standards that result in income figures that most closely approximate real world results.  
Historically, the FASB has rejected deviations from economic accounting for the purpose 
of providing incentives.212 This is not to say, however, that current accounting standards 
always match economic accounting.  Achievement of ideal accounting standards is 
limited by at least two factors.  First, the fundamental principal of conservatism results in 
a bias in favor of early recognition of expense and deferred recognition of income versus 
economic accounting.213 Second, ideal accounting would be prohibitively costly.  Given 
the almost infinite variety of circumstances encountered by businesses, some simplifying 
rules of recognition must be employed to make the system operable.214 Within these 
constraints, however, the FASB has sought to approximate economic accounting. 
 
212 See Facts about FASB, supra note 155, at 2 (mission statement). 
213 See Ross L. Watts, Conservatism in Accounting: Part I: Explanation and Implications, 17 
ACCT. HORIZONS 207 (2003) (examining alternative explanations for and implications of conservatism in 
accounting, which at the extreme is defined by the adage “anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses”). 
214 Consider depreciation expense.  Economic depreciation would reflect the estimated reduction 
in value of a depreciable item year by year and would be highly idiosyncratic.  Because the cost of 
determining and maintaining hundreds or thousands of separate depreciation schedules for the various 
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 However, the potential for financial depreciation incentives is plain.  As an 
example, let us again return to depreciation.  As noted in the previous Part, shifting from 
straight-line to accelerated financial depreciation would result in reduced present value of 
reported earnings, thereby discouraging capital investment.  Suppose, however, that 
Congress were to direct the SEC to permit decelerated financial depreciation for a certain 
class of assets.215 Businesses purchasing these assets could adopt a depreciation schedule 
that would result in even greater reported income in early years (because of smaller 
deductions in early years), with offsetting reductions in income in later years, compared 
against straight-line depreciation.  Given all of the incentives discussed in previous Parts 
for managers to increase the present value of reported earnings, the option to adopt 
decelerated financial depreciation would spur investment in this class of assets. 
 The recent treatment of employee stock options suggests an even more direct 
means of providing accounting incentives – permitting companies to simply “footnote” 
the relevant expense rather than reducing reported earnings.  Suppose, for example, that 
Congress wishes to spur corporate charitable contributions.  These contributions are 
deductible for corporate tax purposes,216 but many corporations pay little or no tax due to 
losses incurred in previous years, other tax incentives that they have embraced, and, in 
some cases, questionable tax shelters.217 Moreover, the tax deduction will only go so far 
in spurring contributions by even tax paying businesses.  Thus, Congress might decide 
that further incentives are in order.  Suppose that Congress were to permit companies to 
refrain from “expensing” qualifying contributions, as long as the contributions were fully 
disclosed in a footnote to the financial statements, just as stock option expense was 
footnoted between 1995 and 2005.  The result, of course, would be that charitable 
contributions would be free from an accounting perspective, and much more attractive to 
managers.  Obviously, this footnoting technique could be used with virtually any current 
corporate expense that Congress wished to encourage, such as the cost of employer 
provided health care (either in place of or in addition to the current tax incentive), 
qualified pension contributions, etc. 
 
B.  Benefits of Instrumental Accounting 
 
The primary benefit of providing corporate incentives through financial 
accounting rules would be the lack of cost to the public fisc.  Replacing tax incentives or 
direct subsidies with accounting incentives would allow Congress to fund other 
programs, reduce tax rates, or pay down debt.  Alternatively, accounting incentives could 
 
vehicles, pieces of equipment, and structures owned by a business would be prohibitive, financial 
accounting standards provide for a limited menu of depreciation schedules. 
215 Decelerated, or sinking fund, depreciation involves relatively small depreciation deductions 
initially that increase over the useful life of the asset.  Decelerated depreciation matches economic 
depreciation for assets that suffer an increasing annual decline in value over their useful lives.  
216 See IRC §§ 170(a) & (b)(2) (authorizing deductions for corporate charitable contributions but 
limiting the amount deductible to 10% of a corporation’s taxable income). 
217 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF 
FOREIGN- AND US-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1996-2000 9 (2004) (63% of U.S. corporations 
(excluding foreign-controlled corporations) and 45.3% of large U.S. controlled corporations (defined as 
those with at least $250 million in assets or $50 million in gross receipts) reported no federal income tax 
liability for the year 2000).   
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be adopted in addition to existing non-accounting incentives, providing more total 
incentives without increasing taxes, and potentially filling gaps in the reach of current 
incentive programs.  I am not suggesting that accounting incentives represent a free 
lunch.  As discussed in the next sections, there would be significant costs associated with 
increased lobbying, potential regulatory capture, increased complexity, and diminished 
financial statement value.  However, the fiscal effects of instrumental accounting would 
be positive. 
 As Stanley Surrey pointed out, direct governmental subsidies and tax incentives 
have an equivalent impact on the public fisc.218 Suppose Congress were to replace a tax 
incentive, such as accelerated tax depreciation, with a direct subsidy that returns the same 
aggregate dollars to the eligible businesses.  This change would have no overall effect on 
tax rates because the additional tax revenues raised by eliminating the tax incentive 
would be needed to fund the direct subsidy.  On the other hand, replacing either a tax 
incentive or a direct subsidy with an accounting incentive reduces the burden on the 
public fisc. 
 Each year Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) prepares a “tax 
expenditure budget” that estimates the economic benefits provided by various tax 
preferences and incentives as compared with “normal” taxation.219 Whether and how a 
normal tax baseline can be defined is subject to great debate, and no one suggests that the 
figures can be used to estimate the revenue effects of eliminating the tax incentives, since 
behavior would change.220 Nonetheless, the figures give us some idea of the magnitude 
of the benefits provided through the tax code.  The JCT’s estimate for corporate tax 
expenditures for 2005 was $86 billion.221 24% of that total, $21 billion, was attributable 
to accelerated tax depreciation and provisions allowing otherwise depreciable items to be 
deducted immediately.222 Decelerating tax depreciation, while at the same time 
providing an earnings break for depreciation, could have a significant impact on the fisc 
while maintaining investment incentives. 
 Corporate sensitivity to accounting incentives would vary significantly depending 
on company leverage, size, and managerial sensitivity to reported earnings.  But, of 
course, this is also true of tax incentives, and a mix of tax and accounting incentives 
potentially could be optimal.  Firms that are flush with cash and profits may be relatively 
insensitive to reported earnings but quite sensitive to tax incentives; while firms that are 
unprofitable and nearing financial distress may be relatively insensitive to tax incentives 
but highly sensitive to earnings-increasing accounting choices.223 
C.  The Costs of Instrumental Accounting     
 
218 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:  A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 726 (1970). 
219 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2005-2009, Jan. 12, 2005. 
220 See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 152, at 46-56. 
221 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 219, at 30-40. 
222 See id. at 33.  In determining the level of tax expenditure associated with accelerated 
depreciation and “bonus” expensing, the JCT uses a straight-line depreciation baseline.  See id. at 6. 
223 As discussed supra note 217, a majority of U.S. controlled corporations reported no tax liability 
for 2000.  However, because corporate tax losses can be carried forward and back in time, a company 
reporting no tax liability for a particular year is not necessarily insensitive to tax incentives.  See IRC § 172. 
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Embracing explicit accounting incentives as a regular tool of public policy would 
result in numerous dislocations and costs.  First, although positive accounting theorists 
focus on contracting costs from an issuer’s perspective, there are other parties to these 
contracts.  Earnings-increasing changes in standards would result in some shifting of 
wealth from creditors to debtors.  Second, instrumental use of accounting standards 
necessitates accepting deviations from accounting rules that most closely reflect the 
economic reality of various transactions.  Such deviations entail costs arising from 
degradation of the information content of financial statements.  Third, shifting the venue 
of some governmental economic intervention to the accounting arena would result in a 
shift and perhaps an increase in lobbying activity, and we might worry whether the 
standard setting process would be particularly susceptible to regulatory capture.  Fourth, 
incorporating explicit accounting incentives into U.S. GAAP could undermine 
international convergence of accounting standards.  Finally, there are a number of 
inefficiencies associated with providing incentives through the tax code, such as 
misplaced administrative responsibility, that might also apply to accounting incentives.   
 
1.  Impact on Corporate Creditors 
 
Under the debt covenant theory, an accounting standard change that 
increases/decreases reported earnings, loosens/tightens sticky covenants, leading to an 
indirect increase/decrease in the share price of leveraged firms affected by the accounting 
change.  Of course, there is another party to these debt covenants, the lender, and to some 
extent the shareholders’ gains or losses are offset by losses or gains to the lender.  
Imagine an accounting standard change that decreases reported earnings, pushing a 
corporation closer to violation of its debt covenants and costly default.  Clearly this is 
costly for the firm, but the lender may benefit.  Companies may take other steps that 
reduce the risk of default that they would not otherwise have taken.  In other words, 
companies may reduce the risk of actual default in order to offset the increased risk of 
technical default arising from the change in standards, and that benefits the lender.  
Positive accounting theory suggests that there will be an overall economic loss in this 
situation.  Presumably, the corporate borrower and lender negotiated the ideal debt 
covenant based on previous accounting standards and the change in standard results in a 
suboptimal outcome.  Nonetheless, the net economic loss is likely to be less than the loss 
to the shareholders. 
 By the same token, an earnings-increasing change in accounting standards pushes 
debtor corporations further from the brink of insolvency, reducing the expected cost of 
technical default, but because the standard change has no affect on the risk of actual 
default, the change undermines the protection afforded by the debt covenants, which is 
costly to lenders.  Again, this is unlikely to be a “zero-sum” effect assuming, reasonably, 
that renegotiation of the covenants is not costless.  The point, however, is that there is no 
free lunch.  The benefit to debtors from earnings-increasing standard changes is costly to 
lenders.    
 However, the cost of earnings-increasing accounting changes for lenders is 
limited and probably would become even more limited if Congress were to embrace 
instrumental accounting.  First, only existing debt agreements are affected by a change in 
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accounting standards.  New agreements can be as easily tuned to standard B as to 
standard A. Second, although debt covenants generally are tied to “floating GAAP” 
today, meaning GAAP in force at the time of measurement, covenants could easily be 
tied to “frozen GAAP,” the rules in force when the debt covenant is signed.  Shifting to 
frozen GAAP also would entail costs, or presumably debt agreements already would be 
written in this fashion, but in an environment in which it was expected that Congress 
would regularly revise accounting standards to provide incentives, frozen GAAP 
agreements might turn out to be more efficient. 
 
2.  Degradation of the Usefulness of Financial Reports 
 
There is an old debate in the academic accounting literature as to whether non-
accounting social welfare effects should be taken into account in setting standards.  The 
accounting purists argued that these “economic consequences” of accounting standards 
should be ignored, that the rules should be as neutral as possible and avoid “influencing 
behavior in any particular direction.”224 The concern of the purists was that adjusting 
standards to reflect non-accounting consequences would lead to a loss of credibility and 
confidence in GAAP.225 
Opposed were academics who believed that accounting neutrality was 
unattainable,226 that standard setters historically had taken non-accounting “economic 
consequences” into account in promulgating rules,227 and that it was the affirmative 
obligation of the standard setter to take these economic consequences into account.228 
This debate has quieted in recent years, and it would appear that the purists won the 
aspirational battle, at least.  Recent FASB statements uniformly embrace the economic 
neutrality objective.229 The only “economic consequence” recognized by FASB as 
having a legitimate role in standard setting is the economic benefits of changes “that 
result[] in financial statements that are more relevant and representationally faithful, and 
thus more useful for decision making.”230 
Although unstated, presumably the central concern of the GAAP purists was that 
a loss of credibility or confidence in GAAP would be costly.  If audited financial 
statements become less credible, reliable, or useful as a result of consequentialist changes 
in standards, users of these statements would be forced to seek alternative sources of data, 
negotiate more protective agreements, or simply accept greater risk in dealing with an 
issuer, all of which is costly.   
 
224 Facts about FASB, supra note 155 (quote from mission statement).  See also DAVID 
SOLOMONS, MAKING ACCOUNTING POLICY 233-35 (1986) (arguing the importance of accounting 
neutrality); Victor H. Brown, Accounting Standards:  Their Economic and Social Consequences, ACCT.
HORIZONS, Sept. 1990, at 95-96 (same). 
225 See Brown, supra note 224, at 94; SOLOMONS, supra note 224, at 232. 
226 See David M. Hawkins, Financial Accounting, the Standards Board and Economic 
Development, THE SAXE LECTURES IN ACCOUNTING, Nov. 12, 1973, at 4. 
227 See Stephen A. Zeff, The Rise of “Economic Consequences,” J. ACCT., Dec. 1978, at 58. 
228 See Hawkins, supra note 226, at 9. 
229 See Facts about FASB, supra note 155, at 2 (mission statement). 
230 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, EXPOSURE DRAFT: SHARE-BASED PAYMENT 
(Mar. 31, 2004), at C34. 
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As highlighted by recent literature from the book-tax conformity debate, the more 
general worry is that departure from financial accounting neutrality would have adverse 
effects on value-relevance of financial statements.231 However, not all departures from 
existing financial accounting standards are equally problematic.  As an example, Hanlon 
and Shevlin consider the effect on conforming depreciation techniques, specifically using 
the accelerated tax depreciation rules for financial reporting.  In this case, they argue that 
the change would result in a “minimal” loss of information “because economic 
depreciation of an asset does not follow either [the tax or book depreciation method] 
exactly.”232 
More generally, deviating from neutrality in order to provide accounting 
incentives results in costly information loss to the markets only if information is truly 
lost.  As long as the standards are unambiguous, shifting from straight-line financial 
depreciation to some explicit decelerated depreciation method, should have minimal 
informational impact.  Even more clearly, shifting an expense from income statement to 
footnote should have no impact on information, just as shifting options expense from 
footnote to income statement will have no informational impact.233 
Thus, while deviating from neutral accounting principals in order to provide 
incentives would inevitably result in some degradation in the value-relevance of financial 
statements, the impact could be limited by focusing on the presentation of information, 
i.e., shifting expenses to footnotes, and maintaining the overall substance of the 
information provided.234 Adverse impact could be limited further by being highly 
selective in adopting the instrumental accounting approach.  For example, given the 
inherent difficulty of matching depreciation schedules to economic depreciation, the 
informational cost of adjusting financial depreciation schedules to spark investment 
might be modest.  Overall, the impact of limited deviations that are carefully 
implemented to preserve as much value-relevant information as possible would likely be 
small. 
 
3.  Lobbying, Regulatory Capture and the Quality of Accounting Incentives 
 
Given the fundamental economic policy issues at stake, instrumental accounting 
should be a tool utilized only by Congress, if at all.  The FASB has quite correctly 
refused to consider economic consequences in its standard setting process.  A private 
body of accountants is not equipped to weigh non-accounting issues and has no access to 
the other, competing means of economic intervention available to Congress.  Thus, 
embracing instrumental accounting would entail relocating some responsibility for the 
standard setting process from the FASB to Congress.   Primary responsibility could 
 
231 See id. at 2 (arguing that value relevance could be undermined “if standard setting and GAAP 
is captured by tax rule-makers, policy makers, and politicians”). 
232 Hanlon & Shevlin, supra note 13, at 29. 
233 Keep in mind that there may be other costs or benefits associated with these adjustments, such 
as contracting cost effects, but the claim here is that these cosmetic changes need not result in degradation 
of information made available to the market. 
234 One might argue, and it could be true, that an earnings-increasing accounting incentive would 
be less effective if the only change was to shift an expense from the body of the financial statement into a 
footnote providing a pro forma earnings calculation undoing the change.  However, this has been the 
situation with stock option expensing from the last decade, and that “incentive” has been very successful. 
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remain with the FASB, with Congress intervening from time to time with respect to 
particular standards, or, following the tax model, primary responsibility could be shifted 
to Congress with implementation entrusted to a governmental agency or perhaps the 
FASB.  In either scenario, however, we should expect increased lobbying over standards, 
worry about the potential for capture by managerial interests, and question the quality of 
instrumental standards that would be promulgated. While a benevolent, disinterested, and 
omniscient social planner could make positive use of instrumental accounting, the politics 
of standard setting should lead us to question whether adding instrumental accounting to 
the regulatory tool kit would increase or decrease social welfare.   
There is certainly reason to be concerned about lobbying costs and regulatory 
capture if instrumental accounting were to become the norm.  Corporate managers would 
have a very strong interest in lobbying Congress and whatever committees Congress 
empowered to oversee financial accounting for earnings-increasing standards, and it is 
not at all clear that there would be any effective lobbying interests countering them.235 
Creditors would be hurt by earnings-increasing standards that undermined the protection 
of debt covenants, but dispersed bond holders, for example, should not be expected to 
form an effective lobby.  Moreover, as discussed above,236 the rational move for creditors 
might be to negotiate covenants relying on frozen GAAP, rather than fighting 
management over accounting standards forming the basis for floating GAAP covenants.  
Shifting to frozen GAAP would not eliminate managers’ lobbying incentive, but it would 
remove a potential, though weak, countervailing lobbying force. Finally, auditors and 
accountants certainly have an interest in accounting standards, but they are more likely to 
be concerned about the consistency and ease of administration of the rules than their 
substance.   
Accounting commentators have worried that eliminating economic neutrality as a 
guiding principle of the standard setting process would lead to a lobbying frenzy and 
severely undermine principled standard setting.237 That is not to say that lobbying does 
not occur today or that it is totally ineffective.  There is evidence that corporations 
effectively lobby the FASB.238 But casual observation suggests that corporate lobbying 
with respect to accounting standards does not approach lobbying of tax writers.  Perhaps 
that is because managers care more about taxes than reported earnings, but I strongly 
doubt it.  It is more likely that the difference arises from the belief that the FASB, with its 
 
235 See supra note 152 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the determinants of 
lobbying effort and expenditure. 
236 See supra Part V.C.1. 
237 See SOLOMONS, supra note 225, at 114 (noting “general agreement among accountants that 
anything that can limit the area of political disagreement in accounting will be beneficial”); Hanlon et al, 
supra note 149, at 37 (suggesting that Congress as a political body would be more susceptible than FASB 
to lobbying); Financial Accounting Foundation Board of Trustees, News Release 06/14/04:  Financial 
Accounting Foundation Trustees Issue Statement Opposing Legislative Proposals to Curb FASB 
Independence (accessible via FASB website) (voicing concern regarding “Congress send[ing] the message 
that special interests are able, through legislation, to overturn expert accounting judgment”). 
238 See Brown & Feroz, supra note 169 (finding that the FASB is influenced by corporate 
comment letters and that larger corporations have more influence than smaller ones).  See also, Edward B. 
Deakin, Rational Economic Behavior and Lobbying on Accounting Issues:  Evidence from the Oil and Gas 
Industry, 64 ACCT. REV. 137 (1989) (investigating lobbying on accounting for oil and gas producing 
activities and finding that contracting and cash flow effects were correlated with lobbying activity). 
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focus on neutrality, rejection of non-accounting policy considerations, and insulation 
from the electoral process, is less susceptible to lobbying than Congress.239 
Congress has rarely intervened in the standard setting process, but its occasional 
interventions give us some clues about the welfare implications of instrumental 
accounting.  Two examples demonstrate the promise and the peril:   
One of the most significant interventions by Congress and the SEC in substantive 
standards occurred in the early 1960s after Congress enacted an investment tax credit.  
Although the tax legislation provided for immediate “flow-through” tax benefits, the 
Accounting Principles Board (FASB’s predecessor) issued an opinion requiring that the 
tax benefits be spread over the lives of the assets purchased for financial reporting 
purposes.240 This conservative approach reduced the favorable earnings impact of the tax 
legislation (versus a parallel flow-through financial accounting approach).  The 
accounting profession was split on the proper treatment, but business leaders lobbied hard 
for flow-through accounting.241 The SEC took the unusual step of overturning the APB’s 
opinion with its own opinion allowing either accounting method to be used.242 About a 
decade later, Congress enacted a new version of the investment tax credit and specified in 
the legislation that either accounting approach would be acceptable – a rare case of 
Congress engaging in instrumental accounting.243 In my view, these were positive 
interventions.  By permitting flow-through accounting of the tax benefits, Congress and 
the SEC boosted the incentive provided by the investment tax credit with no additional 
cost to the fisc and little loss of information to the financial markets. 
The other example involves only threatened intervention and takes us back to the 
stock option expensing story.  As discussed above, the FASB struggled for a decade 
before successfully implementing a requirement that stock option expense be recognized 
consistent with other forms of compensation.  Corporate interests strongly resisted this 
earnings-reducing change in standards and several times enlisted the help of various 
members of Congress in pressuring the FASB to slow or water down its proposals.  To be 
fair, other members of Congress supported the FASB’s efforts, but had the primary 
responsibility for this standard rested with Congress, I have no doubt that the corporate 
interests would have prevailed.  Expensing stock options will discourage their use and the 
new standard can be seen as an unwarranted brake on a popular compensation technique.  
In my view, the old option expense footnoting regime provided an inappropriate 
accounting preference for one particular type of compensation, leading to inefficient 
distortions in pay practices, i.e., over-reliance on options, and a particular form of options 
at that.  The problem, of course, is that this story is not about a difference of opinion 
 
239 According to the economic theory of regulation, lobbying expenditure is a function of the 
potential payoff from lobbying.  See supra note 152 and accompanying text.  All else being equal, the 
expected return on lobbying a more compliant regulator is greater than the return on lobbying a less 
compliant regulator. 
240 See Gary John Previts & Dale L. Flesher, A Perspective on the New Deal and Financial 
Reporting:  Andrew Barr and the Securities Exchange Commission, 1938-1972, 23 BUS. & ECON. HIS.
221, 226 (1994); Joel Seligman, The SEC and Accounting: A Historical Perspective, in THE SEC AND 
ACCOUNTING: THE FIRST 50 YEARS: 1984 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARTHUR YOUNG PROFESSORS’
ROUNDTABLE 3, 19 (Robert H. Mundheim & Noyes E. Leech eds., 1984) 
241 See Seligman, supra note 240, at 19. 
242 See id.; Previts & Flesher, supra note 240, at 226; David Solomons, The Political Implications 
of Accounting and Accounting Standard Setting, 13 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 107, 117 (1983). 
243 See Previts & Flesher, supra note 240, at 226. 
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regarding the merits of stock options, it is about managerial interests that differ from 
shareholder interests and the likelihood that Congress will cater to management interests.   
 In my view, the problem of regulatory capture and the resulting likelihood that a 
Congress that embraced instrumental use of accounting standards would produce as many 
poor standards as good ones probably dooms the enterprise.  Perhaps this is an unduly 
pessimistic view of Washington, but the view seems warranted.  Of course, one can make 
the same point about tax incentives.  The difference is that congressional involvement in 
the tax writing process is inevitable.  That is not the case with the financial standard 
setting process, but more on that after we consider a few other potential costs and benefits 
of instrumental accounting. 
 
4.  Institutionalization of the Importance of Reported Earnings 
 
The idea behind instrumental accounting is to harness managers’ irrational or 
rational but self-serving bias, which inflates the importance of reported earnings, in order 
to shape corporate behavior and increase social welfare.  There is an inherent perversity 
in this idea, in that shareholder welfare would be increased if managers could be educated 
or disciplined into abandoning the bias in the first place.  One might be concerned that 
explicit introduction of accounting incentives into GAAP would somehow institutionalize 
managers’ earnings fixation and lead us further from the happy day in which managers 
fully understand and internalize the ECMH and positive accounting theory. 
 
5.  Conflict with International Convergence of Accounting Standards 
 
In 2002, the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board entered into 
a memorandum of understanding pledging to work towards “high-quality, compatible 
accounting standards that could be used for both domestic and cross-border financial 
reporting.”244 Currently, there is no single set of accounting principles that is generally 
acceptable in all capital markets, and international convergence would result in obvious 
efficiencies. 
Incorporating explicit accounting incentives into U.S. GAAP could undermine 
efforts to achieve international accounting convergence.  For example, financial 
depreciation schedules that were regularly adjusted to fine-tune the incentives for U.S. 
companies to invest in certain asset classes would be problematic for convergence and 
add to the administrative burden of foreign firms attempting to list their shares on U.S. 
markets.   
Without attempting to fully solve this problem here, a number of observations are 
in order.  First, it would appear that the negative effect on international convergence 
could be minimized by limiting accounting incentives to a few discrete issues, such as 
financial depreciation, and by implementing the incentives in such a way as to avoid 
information loss, e.g., by employing the stock option “footnoting” technique.  These are 
the same techniques that were suggested above as means of minimizing the loss of 
information in deviating from economic accounting, so introduction of the international 
convergence issue simply reinforces the reasons for cabining accounting incentives.  
 
244 See Memorandum of Understanding between FASB and IASB (“The Norwalk Agreement”), 
Oct. 2002, accessed via FASB website. 
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Second, it should be noted that calls for increased book-tax conformity raise the same 
issue unless one believes that the systems would be conformed at economic accounting, 
which seems unlikely.  In both cases, the reduction in international convergence is a cost 
of the proposal that must be weighed against the benefits. 
 
6.  Other Costs (and Benefits) of Instrumental Accounting 
 
In a number of important articles and books Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel 
exposed the inefficiencies of providing business incentives through the tax system rather 
than through direct subsidies.245 Accounting incentives would share many, but not all, of 
these inefficiencies. 
One of Surrey and McDaniel’s primary complaints was that tax incentives bypass 
the Congressional committees and regulatory agencies that have the relevant subject 
matter expertise, e.g., agriculture, manufacturing, etc.246 Not only is there a loss of 
expertise when this occurs, but a loss of coordination.  Assuming that Congress patterned 
accounting incentive institutions on the tax model, this complaint would be equally valid.  
Of course, this institutional framework is not inevitable.  Congress could decide that the 
various subject matter committees could employ accounting incentives as a policy tool in 
coordination with direct subsidies and other incentives.  This alternative approach could 
result in the opposite coordination problem, different committees imposing different or 
conflicting accounting standards.  This is not the place to work out a detailed regulatory 
scheme for the promulgation of accounting incentives, but two points should be 
emphasized:  coordination problems and loss of expertise might arise in the promulgation 
of accounting incentives, but the problems inherent in the tax model potentially could be 
mitigated. 
Another complaint was that tax incentives were open ended.247 Unlike direct 
subsidies that must pass through an appropriations process every year, tax incentives, 
once enacted, remain until they are eliminated or revised by future legislation.  
Accounting incentives would be similarly open ended.  Because accounting incentives 
have no direct impact on the public fisc, however, it is not clear that this is a significant 
problem.248 
A further concern was that tax incentives damage the tax system through 
introducing complexity and inconsistency.249 This risk would exist for accounting 
incentives as well.  Ideally, Congress would impose just a few narrowly tailored 
accounting incentives that were designed to preserve relevant financial information while 
encouraging worthwhile economic behavior.  But it is entirely possible that once the 
camel’s nose breached the tent we would wind up with a volume of accounting standards 
 
245 See Surrey, supra note 218; STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT 
OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). 
246 See Surrey, supra note 218, at 728; SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 245, at 106. 
247 See SURREY, supra note 245, at 729-30 & n. 34. 
248 For that matter, tax incentives are much less open ended than they used to be.  Increasingly, tax 
incentive provisions are enacted for a limited period and must be affirmatively renewed to continue in 
force.  See, e.g., IRC § 168(k) (titled, “Special [Depreciation] Allowance for Certain Property Acquired 
After September 10, 2001, and Before January 1, 2005”). 
249 See SURREY, supra note 245, at 731-32; SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 245, at 105-06. 
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that rivaled the tax code.  This issue is sufficiently serious that it is discussed more fully 
in the next section. 
Accounting incentives would be similar to tax incentives in other ways.  Both 
mechanisms generally are very blunt tools for economic intervention.  Consider the 
corporate deduction for charitable contributions.  For firms paying tax at the top marginal 
rate, this deduction amounts to a 35% governmental subsidy for charitable gifts.  Is it 
likely that Congress actually thinks that 35% is the right level of subsidy?  Why not 25% 
or 50%?  And what about the startup firm with no net taxable income that has tax losses 
that can be carried forward for many years?  The effective subsidy in that case rapidly 
approaches zero.  Is that what Congress intended?  In some cases, principally tax 
depreciation and investment tax credits, Congress has actively managed tax incentives.  
More often than not, however, they serve as a very blunt instrument. 
Accounting incentives would suffer from the same defect.  Decelerated financial 
depreciation could be fine tuned based on experience, but shifting an expense from 
income statement to footnote would have a dollar for dollar impact on reported earnings, 
whether this level of earnings impact would provide the right level of incentive or not. 
On the other hand, tax and accounting incentives share an advantage with direct 
subsidies relative to legal mandates in allowing for heterogeneous responses.  Assuming 
that Congress merely wants to encourage an activity and not require it, tax and 
accounting incentives as well as direct subsidies allow businesses to determine whether 
the carrot is sufficiently attractive to merit the change.  However, all of these pros and 
cons are simply further factors to be taken into account in determining whether 
instrumental accounting is a viable tool for implementing government policy in a second 
best world. 
 
D.  Thinking about Accounting Incentives in a Second Best World 
 
It may be useful to think about accounting incentives in the context of the tax 
simplification debate.  The issues are similar.  Undoubtedly, the tax system could be 
more efficiently administered if stripped of various economic incentives such as the home 
mortgage interest deduction, the deduction for charitable contributions, the earned 
income tax credit, and the exclusion for employer provided health insurance.  But we live 
in a second best world.  Assuming one believes that government has a legitimate role to 
play in shaping economic behavior (or even if one believes that government inevitably 
will play that role whether it is legitimate or not), the appropriate question is what 
combination of tax rules, legal mandates, governmental spending programs, and, perhaps, 
accounting standards, most efficiently raises the revenue, shapes the behavior, delivers 
the services, and provides the information.  Congress only has so many levers it can use 
to direct economic behavior.  None is cost free.   
David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have recently made this point with respect to 
tax incentives.  As they say, “[t]he government will, sometimes for the better and 
sometimes for the worse, subsidize, penalize, or regulate various activities, and we must 
decide how this should be done.”250 They argue that it is mistake to focus narrowly on 
the effect of a tax incentive on the complexity and efficiency of the tax code; rather one 
 
250 David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 
YALE L.J. 955, 964 (2004). 
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must consider broader institutional design considerations in determining whether it is 
appropriate to deliver incentives through the tax code.251 
A similar argument could be made for instrumental use of accounting.  
Accounting researchers bemoan potential degradation of financial information, but there 
is no reason to think that maximum value-relevance of financial statements should 
supersede all other considerations.  But there is also a fundamental difference between 
accounting and tax.  Congressional involvement in the federal tax system is unavoidable, 
and thus lobbying and regulatory capture problems in this arena are endemic.  This is not 
true of financial accounting.  With one or two exceptions, Congress historically has not 
involved itself with substantive accounting rules.  We should, therefore, think twice 
before inviting the camel’s nose into this particular tent.  While one can dream of an all-
wise and wholly public-spirited Congress tweaking one or two accounting rules to 
provide helpful incentives to business, the nightmare scenario of one-off, special interest 
driven accounting rules looms large.  As noted above, the constituency with the greatest 
interest in accounting standards and strongest incentive to lobby is corporate 
management.252 The concern, then, is not that inefficient governmental economic 
intervention would simply shift from tax incentives or direct subsidies to accounting 
incentives, but that opening up a new venue for intervention would result in incremental 
social costs, including increased lobbying and regulatory costs, that offset the fiscal and 
other advantages instrumental accounting would provide.  
 Still, given the power and economy of financial accounting standards, it is 
tempting to propose limited consideration of accounting incentives, perhaps as a tie-
breaker in situations in which the proper accounting treatment of an item is subject to 
legitimate debate within the accounting profession or possibly with respect to items for 
which the accounting treatment is admittedly arbitrary to begin with.  A good example of 
the former case was the resolution of the disagreement over the accounting treatment of 
the investment tax credit.  But, of course, distinguishing legitimate debate from 
concocted accounting controversies designed to advance special interest would not be 
easy.  I would place the debate over the FASB’s proposal to require expensing of 
compensatory stock options in the latter category.  
 The best example of an arbitrary accounting standard is probably financial 
depreciation.  The benefits of allowing firms to utilize more decelerated financial 
depreciation methods than are permissible today would seem to outweigh the costs.  But, 
again, aspects of many standards could be deemed arbitrary, and limiting intervention to 
this subset of standards would not be easy.  
 If instrumental accounting could be limited to breaking ties in cases of legitimate 
accounting controversy or adjusting arbitrary standards to take the pressure off of tax 
incentives and direct subsidies, there could be significant social gains.  I would welcome 
suggestions along these lines.  However, without reason to think that intervention could 
be limited, the risks of encouraging intervention seem to outweigh the gains.  And this 
brings us back to the book-tax conformity debate.  While increased conformity may be 
advantageous in isolation, we should be concerned that encouraging Congress to 
intervene in financial accounting in the name of conformity could start us down the road 
towards wholesale politicization of the standard setting process. 
 
251 See id. at 958-60. 
252 See supra Part V.C.3. 
ACCOUNTING AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 
57 
 
CONCLUSION 
Using financial accounting standards to help shape corporate behavior is a 
provocative idea, but whether instrumental accounting ultimately is embraced as a public 
policy tool is to some degree secondary.  The main argument of this Article has been that 
accounting standards shape corporate behavior, whether we recognize the fact or not, and 
that this power of accounting has important public policy implications.  We cannot 
adequately evaluate calls for increased book-tax conformity or other proposals with 
accounting implications without taking the incentive properties of accounting rules into 
consideration. 
 Even more generally, it is regrettable that there is so little cross-fertilization of 
ideas between researchers focused on accounting and those specializing in law and 
corporate governance.  Positive accounting theory may not be a complete explanation for 
why accounting matters, but it is an important theory with a rich empirical literature that 
corporate governance scholars must reckon with.  On the other hand, accounting 
researchers would benefit from more thorough incorporation of agency theory into their 
models.  Accounting is too important to be left to accountants, and much too important to 
be left to the unquestioned discretion of corporate managers.  Further research building 
on the groundwork laid by several disciplines is needed to provide a fuller account of 
why and how accounting matters, what we can and should expect from managers faced 
with accounting and accounting-sensitive operational choices, and the proper policy role 
for financial accounting standards. 
 
